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WE'RE ONLY FOOLING OURSELVES:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BIASES INHERENT IN
THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S TREATMENT OF RAPE VICTIMS
(OR LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES:
ABANDONING A FUNDAMENTALLY PREJUDICED
SYSTEM & MOVING TOWARD A RATIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF RAPE)
BY THOMAS A. MITCHELL*

"You know what a rape usually is? It's a woman who changed
her mind afterward."'
"It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore
ought severely and impartially to be punished with death; but it
must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party
accused, tho never so innocent."2
"Since four out of five rapes go unreported, it is fair to
say categorically that women do not find rape 'an accusation
easily to be made.'. . . [The issue in rape cases] is based on the
cherished male assumption that female persons tend to lie." 3

* J.D. University of Notre Dame, 2005; Assistant District Attorney for the
25th Judicial District of Texas.
This Article is dedicated to Professor Robert Rodes for introducing me to
medieval legal history, to my parents for their patience and understanding,
and
to all survivors of sexual abuse for their strength and courage.
1
JOHN UPDIKE, RABBIT REDUX 37 (1971).
2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (W.A.
Stokes & E. Ingersoll eds, 1st Am. ed., 1847).
3 SusAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE

369

(1975); see also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 5 (1987) ('The male rape fantasy
is a nightmare of being caught in the classic, simple rape. A man engages in
sex. .. . But this time is different: she charges rape. There are no witnesses.
It's a contest of credibility, and he is the accused 'rapist'.").
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INTRODUCTION

The more things change, the more they stay the same.
In the past 800 years, many changes have been wrought in the
treatment of the crime of rape in the Anglo-American legal
system. Many of these changes, particularly in recent decades,
have been intended to protect the alleged victims of rape, to
encourage victims to report the crime, and to convict a higher
percentage of offenders. 4 Given the prevalence of rape and
other forms of sexual assault in this country, these efforts
should be lauded.6 However, while improvements have been
made and should not be underappreciated, real progress has
been minimal. 6 The underlying problem, its causes, and the
majority of its consequences are the same today as they were at
the formation of the Anglo-American legal system, almost a
millennium ago.
Substantial scholarship, litigation, and general debate
have disputed the propriety of changes in the law's treatment
of rape cases and the statutes enacted to effectuate these
changes. 7 On the side of "reformers" and victim's rights
advocates, it has been argued that the legal system "rapes" or
4 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412-15.

A few statistics will show the importance of the issue of improving the law in
relation to rape to today's legal system. First, approximately 1.3 women in the
United States are raped each minute, totaling to over 680,000 rapes each year.
See ANNE M. DERINGER, CEASE: RAPE STATISTICS, http://oak.cats.ohiou.edu/
-ad361896/anne/ceaserapestatisticspage.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2004); UCSC
RAPE PREVENTION EDUCATION: RAPE STATISTICS, http'J/www2.ucsc.edu1rapepreventionlstatistics.html (last updated Sept. 17, 2004).
Second, the percentage of rapes reported to the police are unusually
low, and only two percent of rapists are convicted and imprisoned. See UCSC
RAPE PREVENTION EDUCATION: RAPE STATISTICS; Christina E. Wells & Erin
Elliot Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist:A Feminist Critique
of Recent Rape Legislation,81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 128-29 (2001) (quoting STAFF
5

OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103d CONG., THE RESPONSE To RAPE: DETOURS

ON THE ROAD To EQUAL JUSTICE iii (Comm. Print 1993)).
Additionally, for a comparison of various

statistical

studies

regarding rape, see DIANA E.H. RUSSELL & REBECCA M. BOLEN, THE EPIDEMIC

(2000).
6 See, e.g., Wells & Motley, supra note 5, at 151 ("[M]ost research shows only
marginal improvement in the legal system's response to rape.').
OF RAPE AND CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES

7 See FED. R. EVID. 412-15.
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victimizes the woman8 a second time. 9 Thus, the argument
goes that the law must be changed to provide adequate
protection to the victim and to substantiate justice against the
offender. On the other side, endorsed by defendant's rights
advocates and civil libertarians, the argument states that the
Constitution prohibits these statutory protections.' 0
Any
interest of the "prosecutrix," the woman bringing the
allegations, is outweighed by the accused's rights under the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Both of
these positions have merit. Therefore, the law finds itself in a
quagmire of judicial opinions attempting to satisfy rights that
are presented as mutually exclusive."
The problem, however, is not really with the law in its
current incarnation. The problem is deeper - it is in society's
persistent (mis)conceptions of the crime of rape. Although the
law can serve as a conduit for social change, it can also impede

8 This Article will distinctly consider rape as a crime committed by a man
against a woman above the age of consent. There are many debated issues in
the crime of rape, including concepts such as statutory rape, spousal rape,
and interracial rape, to name a few. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
discuss any of these topics. Furthermore, the author wishes to affirm the
view that rape of men, both by other males and by females, does in fact occur.
For an interesting treatment of this issue, see, e.g., MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE
ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME (1997).
9 See, e.g., Wells & Motley, supra note 5, at 149 ("Scholars argued that legal
rules... effectively put[] the rape victim on trial.").
10 See, e.g., Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution:
Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44
CATH. U. L. REv. 711, 712 (1995) ("This uncertainty has . . . given rise to
concern that excessive restrictions on admissibility may infringe upon a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to present a defense and to confront and
cross-examine his accusers.").
11See, e.g., Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991) (determining that the
constitutionality of preclusion of prior sexual conduct evidence for failure to
follow procedural requirements depended upon the particular requirements
of the rape shield statute), People v. Ivers, 587 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 1998)
(limiting the ability of statements to qualify as prior sexual conduct), and
Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696 (Pa. 1992) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment prohibited exclusion of evidence of prior sexual conduct by rape
shield laws in some situations).
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12
change by codifying and validating society's misperceptions.
In the area of rape, the law has done the latter. This has
happened because the law displays the belief that these
protections are necessary for the alleged victim. In other
words, the presence of a rape shield law in and of itself implies
that a rape shield law is necessary to prevent admissibility of
the information barred by the law; the implication is that the
information would be relevant and admissible if not for the
statute. 13 Thus, the true problems are the underlying ones,
which have been embedded in these new statutes - the societal
beliefs that rape law is so different from other crimes as to
necessitate its own evidentiary rules and that prior lack of
chastity by a victim has some bearing on her consent in this
case.
Of course, rape is different from other crimes. Rape is
both more difficult to prove and more difficult to defend
because rape involves the intent of the victim.' 4 The mental
state of the accuser is part of the corpus delicti. In most laws,
only the intent of the defendant is an issue; it is the mens rea, a
substantive element of the crime. 15 However, in rape, the
intent of the accuser is more important than the intent of the
accused.' 6 This is a large difference from most cases. But this
difference does not lead to the conclusion that different
evidentiary rules are necessary for rape cases. Instead, societal
recognition of the realities of rape is necessary, so that the
normal rules of evidence can be applied correctly to rape cases.

See, e.g., John A. Perkins, The ChangingFoundationsof InternationalLaw:
From State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 433, 508 (1997)
("Ideas that reflect the reality and understanding of their time support and
facilitate necessary change. And ideas that linger beyond their time impeded
necessary change.").
13 See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note ("[A]n accused may
introduce pertinent evidence of the character of the victim, as in support of a
claim of ...consent in a case of rape.").
14 See, e.g., Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 643, 689 (2001) ('CThe emphasis on autonomy has also caused a shift in
doctrine regarding the amount of resistance a woman has to put up in order
to claim that what occurred was against her will.").
12

15 See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG, & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 181-286 (4th ed. 2000).

16 See id. at 1109-13.
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The problem with rape is caused by a persistent
lingering of the idea of rape as an affront to chastity, as
opposed to rape as an affront to autonomy.' 7 Throughout most
of history, rape was considered a crime against the chastity of
the victim; even in cases in which the victim was not a virgin,
the victim had the right to change her ways.' 8 During the
women's movement of the 1970s, this concept of rape gave way
to the idea of rape as an injury to a woman's autonomy.' 9 A
woman has the right to choose when and with whom she will
engage in sex.
Despite this change, the controversy in rape cases still
tends to center around the woman's "character" for chastity her past sexual conduct and/or her "sexual" conduct with the
accused, i.e. whether she "invited" intercourse. 20 In most cases,
the issue of the woman's consent, or lack thereof, dominates
the trial. This is how the woman's actions become relevant her actions show whether she was "more likely" to consent to
this man. 21 This result may be inevitable in rape cases - it
may be impossible to prevent a rape case from revolving
around the woman. An unfortunate consequence is produced
because of this, however: rape cases appear as if the alleged
victim is on trial, not the defendant. Therefore, determining
what evidence is and is not admissible and the procedures for
consideration of potential evidence hold additional importance
in the rape context.
This Article will show that the underlying problem in
rape cases is this lingering historical assumption in society
See Rodes, supra note 14, at 686 ('"The law concerning rape has developed
ambiguously with a shift of emphasis from the chastity of the victim to her
17

autonomy.").

See id. at 687; People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
19 See Rodes, supra note 14, at 687 ('"These sentiments seem to have been
regarded as good law well into the 1970s.").
20 See, e.g., Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993);
Complaint/Information, People v. Bryant (Col. County/District Ct. July 18,
at
03CR204),
available
2003)
(No.
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docslbryant/cobryant7103cmp.pdf
[hereinafter Bryant Complaint].
21 See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution:
Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44
CATH. U. L. REV. 711, 715 (1995).
18
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that a woman's previous lack of chastity is somehow a
"pertinent character trait"22 in a trial for rape, that the
standard rules of evidence 23 can adequately accommodate both
the privacy rights of the alleged victim and the constitutional
rights of the defendant, and that the rape-specific rules of
evidence 24 work to reinforce the historical assumptions and
prevent progress in society's understanding of the crime of
rape. Section I of this Article will provide the history of the law
of rape in the Anglo-American legal system, from the creation
of the system after the Norman invasion until the rise of the
women's movement in the 1970s. This history will show the
original requirements and underlying assumptions implicit in
the law, substantive changes made to the law, and how those
changes preserved the original rationales of rape law. Section
II will then provide an analysis of the "rape shield" laws and a
discussion of the case law between 1970 and 1990. The third
section will complete the history of rape law, while
demonstrating the impact that rape-specific evidentiary rules
have had on the cases. Section IV will show how the current
laws of evidence, without the rape shield statutes, would
adequately accommodate all of the concerns inherent in rape
cases. In the fifth section, a method to solve the problems
created by the rape shield laws, while still retaining their
benefits, will be presented - repeal of the rape shield laws and
incorporation of the concepts behind those laws into the
working of the other rules of evidence. Finally, this Article will
conclude by positing that all actors in rape cases would be
better served by implementing this solution, forcing society to
begin to change its perceptions of rape and rape complainants
and reaffirming that women have the right to choose.

22
23
24

FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
See FED. R. EVID. 403, 404, 608.
See FED. R. EVID. 412-15.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAW OF RAPE IN THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM

A. Origins in Twelfth Century England Through The
American Revolution
1. The Twelfth Through Sixteenth Centuries
The treatise written by Randolph Glanvill provides a
sound starting place for analyzing the history of rape law.
Glanvill wrote his treatise sometime between 1187 and 1189,25
and it includes a short discussion of "the plea of the crime of
rape."26 The very first sentence in this section reads: "In the
crime of rape a woman charges a man with violating her by
force in the peace of the lord king."27 However, the law
required a formal process before a woman could bring a charge
of rape. The woman claiming to be violated had to report it
shortly afterward, and she had to show the injury and any rips
in her clothes or blood on her person to "trustworthy men" in
"the nearest vill."28 She had to then proceed "to the reeve of the
hundred" (akin to the sheriff, whom was the reeve of the shire)
29
and the county court, where she had to make the same report.
The accused then had the option of either submitting "to the
burden of the ordeal '30 or attempting to "disprov[e] the
accusation of the woman."3 1 Finally, it was permissible for the
woman and man to "be reconciled to each other by marriage,"
although it had to be consented to by the woman, as the man's
willingness for marriage alone would not excuse him from
punishment.3 2 Thus, a representation of rape law in the
25 RANNULF GLANVILL, THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM

OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL xi (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965).
26 Id. at 175.
27 Id.

28

Id.

29 Id.

30 Id. at 176. The option for the man to submit to the ordeal ended in 1215,
however. See Bruce Kahn, Applying the Principles and Strategies of Asian
Martial Arts to the Art of Negotiation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 223, 223 n.2 (1994)
("[T]rial by ordeal was abolished in 1215.").
31 See GLANVILL, supranote 25, at 176.
32 See id.
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twelfth century can be constructed: a woman could bring the
suit; rape was committed by a man who violated a woman by
force; strict formal requirements after the alleged incident
occurred must have been observed; and the woman could
essentially pardon her attacker by agreeing to marry him.
A more complete picture of the early status of the crime
of rape can be found in a sampling of typical cases and statutes
from this period. One common outcome of cases involved the
failure of the prosecutrix to follow up on her appeal. 33 In these
cases, the alleged victim would end up in mercy for a false
appeal and would either be fined 34 or taken to jail. 35 The
accused, on the other hand, would be released from her claim,
but would still be liable to suit by the king. Therefore, he
would pay either half a mark or a mark "by pledge of another" 36
37
to say that he was not guilty, and he would then be set free.
These cases are numerous, and they display the difficulty of
charging rape at this time. The woman was expected to fully
pursue her appeal because she was expected to defend her
chastity. Moreover, if she failed to pursue her case, she would
be taken into custody and he would generally wind up being let
Thus, these cases provide some evidence that the
go. 38
rationale behind rape was to protect a woman's chastity and
that there were potential consequences to the prosecutrix for
bringing a charge of rape.
Many additional requirements were placed on the
alleged victim. For example, in Hulle v. Whatcomb,39 the
prosecutrix appealed for rape. The defendant denied the rape,
claiming that the alleged victim did not raise the hue and "did
33

See 83

SELDEN SOCIETY, PLEAS BEFORE THE KING OR HIS JUSTICES: 1198-1212

(Doris Mary Stenton ed.,1966) (nos. 3475-77, 3490).
34 See id. (no. 3475).
35 See id. (nos. 3476, 3477, 3490).
36 See, e.g., id. (no. 3477).
37 See id. (nos. 3475-77, 3490).
38 See id. (nos. 3475-77, 3490). As will be seen, the alleged victim was taken
into custody any time she lost her case. However, although this may seem
unduly harsh, this was probably a reaction to the fact that a man convicted of
rape would be sentenced to death. See Statute of Westminster of 1275, 1
Statutes of the Realm, Y.B. 3 Edw. 1, c. 13, at 29.
39

90 SELDEN

SOCIETY, ROLL AND WRIT FILE OF THE BERKSHIRE

317 (M. T. Clanchy ed.,1973) (no. 787).

EYRE OF

1248,

at
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not come to the next county [court]."40 As an alternative, if the
suit was properly made, "he puto himself on [the verdict of] the
country."4 1 The coroners' rolls showed that she had not gone to
the next county, so she was in mercy for a false appeal and was
to be taken into custody. 42 To protect the king's peace, jurors
were still summoned, and they said that he had forced her into
sex, so he was in mercy and was taken into custody. 43 This
case shows that failure to fulfill even one of the procedural
hurdles, which were required at the time of the alleged rape,
necessary to bring a suit was fatal to the woman's case and
resulted in the woman being in mercy for a false appeal.44 In
addition, the case did not end if the woman failed in her
appeal. It was prosecuted by the king. This shows that rape
was considered to be a serious offense. Finally, the verdict was
rendered by a jury, who made their decision based upon their
own personal knowledge. Thus, issues such as consent could
not be determined based upon the word of the alleged victim,
but could only be based upon her actions during and
immediately after the alleged rape - the corroborating evidence
of the crime.
Another case which demonstrates the requirements to
file suit for appeal of rape is Seler v. Limoges. 45 In the case,
Joan, an eleven-year-old girl brought an appeal of rape. 46 In
the case, she alleged that she had raised the hue and the cry
and pursued him from ward to ward, to the sheriffs, and to the
coroner. 47 The defense claimed that the process was not
48
correctly followed and that the suit had been brought too late.
Furthermore, Joan had already brought this suit in a different
court, in which she had been non-suited. 49 The judgment in the
Id. at 318.
Id.
42 Id.
43
Id.
44 Id.
40

41

45 Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (1321),

reprinted in 85 SELDEN SocIETY 87 at cxxiii (Helen

M. Cam ed.,1968).
46
Id.at cxxiii.
47

Id. at 88.

48 Id.

49 Id. at 89.

In the previous case, Joan had brought suit and Reymund de

Limoges had answered that he was a clerk and could not answer without his
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case was for the defendant because first, the appeal varied
from the plaint which was made before the coroner (the day on
which the rape allegedly occurred was Sunday according to the
plaint and was Tuesday according to the appeal) and therefore
was defective and could not be pursued and second, the king's
suit had already been argued in the previous case, and could
not be brought again. 50 Therefore, the alleged victim had to
remain in prison due to her false appeal, and the defendant
was set free. 5 1 Again, it can be seen that the prosecutrix had to
clear a number of procedural hurdles to bring a claim, that any
defect in the procedure was fatal to her case, and that she
suffered repercussions for these deficiencies. It can also be
seen that the defendant had a number of alternatives for
challenging and/or defending an appeal of rape. Finally, the
importance of bringing a suit quickly after the alleged rape,
and the dubious nature with which rape allegations were
viewed if charges were not brought almost immediately, can be
seen by the defense's allegation that the suit was begun well
after the "time limit of forty days within which one ought to
'52
commence appeal of rape.
Two additional cases display important aspects of, and
typical results in, rape cases. First, in a case from the
Warwickshire Eyre in 1221, the prosecutrix appealed for rape,
and the defendant put himself upon the verdict. 53 The jurors
found him not guilty for two reasons. First, the defendant had
already had her "a long time before this" by her own free will
and again in her father's house, and, second, "no cry was
Ordinaries. Id. at 91. The jury was called so that his status upon delivery to
the Ordinary could be ascertained. Id. When the case reconvened, however,
he dropped his claim of status as a clerk and put himself upon the jury. Id.
Joan did not show up to pursue her appeal, so she was found in mercy and
was arrested. Id. Thus, Reymund was quit of her suit, and the jury stated
that he was not guilty, so he was quit of the king's suit. Id. at 91-92.
Interestingly, there is speculation about whether Reymund was being framed
by Joan's father or whether Reymund had pled that he was a clerk in order to
buy
time to bribe the jury. Id. at cxxiv.
50
Y.B. 14 Edw. 2, supra note 45, at 89-90.
51 Id. at 90.
52
Id. at 88.
53 1 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN V. 1, A.D. 1200-1225, at 109
(F.W. Maitland ed., 1887).
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raised."54 Again, she was in mercy for a false appeal and was
56
taken into custody. 55 In the second case, Crawe v. Robert, it

was "testified that he thus raped her and that she was seen
bleeding." 57 The suit was concluded, however, not by a verdict
against the defendant, but by settlement of the claim by an
58
agreement of marriage between the victim and the defendant.
These two cases make two important points: (1) if the alleged
victim has consented to previous relations with the defendant,
her case is much harder to make and subject to greater
speculation, and (2) the affront to chastity could be forgiven by
the alleged victim by agreeing to marry him, which thereby
removes the affront because he will be her husband.
Finally, two statutes and a passage from The Mirror of
Justices shed some light on the law of rape during this period.
The first Statute of Westminster, enacted in 1275, prohibited
"ravishing" any underage girl with or without her consent and
"any Wife or Maiden of full Age, [or] any other Woman, against
her Will."59 In the event of a violation, suit had to be brought

within forty days, for which "the King shall do common right" which was the death sentence. 60 If suit was not brought within
the time limit, the accused had to answer to the King, but the
punishment was reduced to two years imprisonment and a
fine. 61 In 1285, the second Statute of Westminster contained a
new provision for rape. 62 In this prohibition, a man who
ravished a woman, "married, Maid, or other," without consent
was sentenced to death. 63 Additionally, even if she consented
afterwards, he still had to answer to the King, and the
punishment for a conviction was still death.64 The Mirror of
Justices contains one last issue regarding the consent of the
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 109-10.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 3.
Id.

Id.
59 1 Statutes of the Realm, Y.B. 3 Edw. 1, c. 13, at 29 (1275).
6 Id.
61
62
63

Id.
1 Statutes of the Realm, Y.B.13 Edw. 1, c. 33, at 87 (1285).
Id.

64 Id.

84
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woman. If the woman became pregnant due to the alleged
65
rape, it provided some indication that she had consented.
Thus, pregnancy was an available defense to a charge of rape.
These references make a number of important points. First,
the woman did not have to be a virgin in order to be raped.
Second, there was a statute of limitations of only forty days for
bringing a charge of rape - reinforcing the importance of
protecting the victim's chastity and corroborating evidence (as
the incident would be fresh in the minds of the townspeople,
who were the potential jurors). Third, the severity of the
punishment for committing a rape - conviction led to the death
sentence. 66
Finally, the recognition of pregnancy as an
indication of consent by the woman shows the importance of
any external evidence which could be used to corroborate or
refute the alleged victim's claim.
2.

The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

A number of prominent treatises were written during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Three of particular
67
prominence are Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England,
69
Hale's Pleas of the Crown,68 and Blackstone's Commentaries.
All three of these jurists dealt with the topic of rape.
Therefore, this section will first present an overview of the
SELDEN SOCIETY, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES 103 (Frederick William
Maitland ed.,1893). See also 105 SELDEN SOCIETY, READINGS AND MOOTS AT
THE INNS OF COURT VOL. II, at 275 (Samuel E. Thorne and J. H. Baker
eds.,1989) (stating that an appeal for rape could be abated due to the
prosecutrix' pregnancy, as proof of her consent; although the clergy contended
that only the body consented and not the mind, but the justices held their
authority was only over the body).
66 All felonies were subject to the death penalty until relatively recently. See
Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment
and the Mentally Retarded Defendant After Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L.
REv. 327, 352 (2002) ("Beginning in the thirteenth century, death was the
fixed punishment for murder and virtually all felony crimes, regardless of
their severity or frequency.").
65 7

67

3 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (J.H.

Thomas ed., 1836).
68 HALE, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
69 4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

(Thomas M. Cooley & James DeWitt Andrews eds., 4th ed. 1899).
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state of the law of rape according to each of these jurists and
then, will demonstrate some of these issues using an exemplary
70
case from Massachusetts.
i. Coke
Lord Coke wrote his multi-volume treatise, The
Institutes of the Laws of England, between 1628 and 1644. In
the FirstInstitute, he defined rape as "when a man hath carnal
knowledge of a woman by force and against her will." 71 Nonconsent of the female was an element of the crime, and "the
guilt [would] not be lessened, if her consent was obtained by
duress, threats of murder" or by consent after-the-fact.7 2 Also,
it was possible to rape someone who was not a virgin because
73
"the law presumes the possibility of her return to virtue."
This treatise provides a number of significant insights into the
law of rape at this time. First, the definition of rape did not
just require sexual conduct without the consent of the woman,
but it also required actual physical force (as opposed to
threatened force, deception, fear, or emotional force). This
again promotes the idea that rape was an affront to chastity,
and the woman was expected to protect her chastity with all of
her power. The next few concepts, that coerced consent or later
consent could not relieve the defendant of guilt and that the
law assumes the woman can return to virtue, also show the
prevalence of the ideal of female chastity. Finally, the fact that
a woman permanently "consented" to sexual relations with her
The choice of a case from Massachusetts was based on two considerations:
(1) its nature of being representative of cases from the time, and (2) the fact
that it is inclusive of most of the important concepts from the time. The
origin of the case in Massachusetts thus has no material bearing on its
inclusion here.
71 COKE, supra note 67, at 436. Coke provides a slightly different definition in
his Third Institute, wherein he defines rape as a common law felony
consisting of "the unlawfull and carnall knowledge and abuse of any woman
above the age of ten years against her will, or of a woman child under the age
of ten years with her will, or against her will." EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART
OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 60 (William S. Hein Co. Reprint
1986).
72 COKE, supra note 67, at 436.
70

73 Id.
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husband provides another source of proof that the rationale
behind the law was to protect a woman's chastity; the woman
could not revoke consent from her husband once she had
married him - either because (1) the matrimonial consent
extended to intercourse and was irrevocable or (2) rape was
premised on the concept that the victim was 'dishonoured' or
74
'debauched' by the rapist."
ii. Hale
Hale's Pleas of the Crown provides another influential
depiction of the law of rape.7 5 He defines rape as "the carnal
knowledge of any woman above the age of ten years against her
will, and of a woman-child under the age of ten years with or
against her will." 76 However, to be sufficient, the allegation
must state that "the rape was committed with violence and
against the will of the woman." 77 Also, a husband could not
rape his wife because "by their mutual matrimonial consent
and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto
her husband, which she cannot retract."78 Moreover, if an
unmarried couple lived together, this was evidence of assent on
her part, although it was not dispositive because "the woman
may forsake that unlawful course of life." 79 If the consent was
given only upon threat of death, it was "not a consent to excuse
a rape."80 Conception was no longer held to prevent an act
74 See Rodes, supra note 14, at 682-83

supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 626-36. This work
is the source of oft-quoted language used by courts both in jury instructions
and as a general guideline for deciding rape cases: "It is true rape is a most
detestable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be punished
with death; but it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be
made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused,
tho never so innocent." Id. at 634. For an interesting and informative
discussion of this statement and rape law in eighteenth-century England in
general, see Laurie Edelstein, An Accusation Easily to be Made? Rape and
Malicious Prosecution in Eighteenth-CenturyEngland, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
351 (1998).
76 HALE, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 627-28.
77 Id. at 628.
78
Id. at 629.
79 Id. at 628.
80
Id. at 631.
75 HALE,
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from being considered a rape.8 ' But if the woman consented
afterwards, she no longer had an appeal; this did not impact
others though, and her husband still could appeal and the king
82
could still bring suit.
For the requirements imposed upon the prosecutrix in
order to bring a suit, the woman had to "make fresh discovery
and pursuit of the offense and offender" and the appeal had to
"be speedily prosecuted."8 3 Failure to comply with either of
these requirements led to a "presumption of a malicious
prosecution."8 4 Additionally, the alleged victim was permitted
to testify, but her testimony was to be weighed according to the
corroborating factors in the case, such as her reputation; how
quickly she reported the offense; the presence of visible injuries
on her person; if she cried out or was too far from people for it
to matter; and whether the accused fled.85 The absence of
these factors led to "a strong presumption, that her testimony
86
[was] false or feigned."
Finally, Hale stated that rape "is an accusation easily to
be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by
the party accused, tho never so innocent."8 7 Hale then provided
two examples of women who had filed false accusations of rape
- the men accused of the crime were later found to be impotent.
After discussing these trials at some length, Hale finally
concluded by stating:
I only mention these instances, that we may be
the more cautious upon trials of offenses of this
nature, wherein the court and jury may with so
much ease be imposed upon without great care
and vigilance; the heinousness of the offense
many times transporting the judge and jury with
so much indignation, that they are over hastily
carried to the conviction of the person accused
81 Id.

Id.
Id. at 632, 633.
84 Id. at 633.
85 Id.
82
83

86 Id.

87

Id.at 634.
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thereof, by the confident testimony sometimes of
88
malicious and false witnesses.
Thus, Hale shows his concern that the right of the defendant to
a presumption of innocence will be lost in rape cases due to the
89
nature of the crime.
Hale provides several significant insights beyond those
presented by Coke.90 The presumption that the suit was a
malicious prosecution if the prosecutrix failed to adequately
meet the requirements for bringing suit reveal one of the
underlying biases in rape law: fear that women will bring false
charges against innocent men. 91 This fear also appears in
Hale's statements about caution in these cases and the
difficulty in defending them. 92 This fear and the chastity
rationale can also be seen in the corroborating factors listed by
Hale, all of which relate to evidence external to the alleged
victim to prove her case and to show that she was trying to
protect her chastity.
iii. Blackstone
Blackstone's Commentaries, drafted between 1765 and
1769, also provide some insight into the rape law. 93 Blackstone
also defined rape as "the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly
and against her will."94 Blackstone also discusses the reporting
requirements discussed above, but states that there was no
time limitation during this period. 95 This was because "time
runs not against the king" and most suits were brought by the

88 Id. at 636.
89 See Edelstein, supra note 75, at 355-56.
90 For purposes of brevity, the points made in the discussion regarding Coke
will not be repeated here. See supra Part I.A.2.i.
91 See Rodes, supra note 14, at 688 ('The main rationale for the now
discredited use of the victim's unchastity as evidence of consent seems to
have been a worry... about the danger of false accusations.").
92 This statement is not intended to make any comment on the accuracy of
those fears.
93 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 69.
94 Id. at 210.
95
Id.
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king, "but the jury will rarely give credit to a stale complaint." 96
Blackstone specifically discusses rape as protecting the
violation of a woman's chastity, stating that rape can be
committed against a prostitute or harlot "because the woman
may have forsaken that unlawful course of life."97 Finally,
Blackstone quotes Hale's discussion of testimony and
credibility of the prosecutrix.
Thus,
Blackstone
substantially
reiterates
the
statements of the other two treatises, but with a few additional
emphases. First, the fact that juries would not give credit to
complaints which are not brought soon after the alleged
incident stresses the importance of the appearance of the
woman protecting her chastity and corroborating evidence.
Second, he underscores the rationale of rape as an affront to
the woman's chastity.
98
iv. An Example: A Massachusetts Case

A few initial observations should be made regarding the
extremely low reporting rate of rape in Massachusetts during
the seventeenth century. 99 A number of factors accounted for
this low rate. First, there were severe "consequences of a
public admission of loss of virginity" - namely, it was "a
significant bar to future marriage."'10 0 Second, accusing a man
of rape carried with it a significant risk of being prosecuted for
fornication.101 Finally, due to the "difficulty in securing a
conviction," there was not a great likelihood of success of the
charge even if it were brought. 10 2 Thus, there were significant
barriers to bringing a rape charge in the first place.

Id.
Id. at 213.
98 Again, the geographic origin has no meaning in the choice of the case
analyzed. See supra note 70.
96

97

99 Else L. Hambleton, 'Playing the Rogue" Rape and Issues of Consent in
Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, in SEX WITHOUT CONSENT: RAPE AND
SEXUAL COERCION IN AMERICA
100 Id. at 36.
101
102

Id.
Id. at 37.

27 (Merril D. Smith ed., 2001).
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Nevertheless, a few rape charges were brought. In an
illustrative case, Elizabeth Emerson of Havervill had charged
Timothy Swan with rape. She claimed that he "had raped her
in her parents' new bedchamber, which [he] had asked to
This charge was "greeted with skepticism."'10 4
see."'10 3
Neighboring women questioned "why she hadn't scratched or
kicked him" and "asserted that she would have made ye towne
ringe of it before ye morning."'0 5 These statements show that
"there was a community expectation that rape victims should
struggle vigorously and call out."'106 Furthermore, she became
pregnant, and depositions "provide evidence of the Puritan
expectation that" a woman could not become pregnant if she
was a virgin prior to the instance of intercourse that caused her
pregnancy. 10 7 They did not believe "that conception would...
occur as the outcome of rape."'0 8 Additional damage was done
to her claim by her failure to cry out or to make "a timely
accusation of rape."'0 9 In fact, the combination of all of these
factors was so great that "Swan was not charged with rape or
fornication."'110
Emerson, however, was charged with
fornication."'
This case shows the difficulties with bringing a rape
charge. Emerson's initial charge was received skeptically. The
initial reaction of others was to ask for corroborating evidence
and to query why she had not fought harder to protect her
chastity. Additionally, the fact that she conceived a child
weighed heavily against her. She also failed to cry out or to
bring the action quickly enough. Finally, the repercussions
associated with bringing a charge can be witnessed by the fact
that she was prosecuted for fornication, but the alleged rapist
was not charged at all.
103

Id. at 30.

104

Id.

105

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

106

107
08

1

Id.

Id. at 31.

Id.

109 Id.
110 Id.

111 Id. at 30. In fact, it was the depositions from her prosecution for
fornication which provided the information regarding this case. Id.
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B. The Nineteenth Century
Rape trials in the nineteenth century generally involved
one of three main issues: the admissibility of evidence of the
unchastity of the prosecutrix, sufficiency of the evidence
proffered by the prosecutrix, and what constituted "consent" by
the prosecutrix. This section will briefly explore each of these
issues through presentation of some representative cases.
1. Unchastity Evidence
Generally, evidence regarding the admissibility of the
prosecutrix's reputation for chastity was admissible for three
purposes - to "judge the intention of the defendant," 112 to help
determine whether the alleged victim had consented, 113 and to
impeach the credibility of the alleged victim. 114 The Georgia
case of Camp v. State" 5 provides an example of these concepts.
In the case, the defendant was charged with attempt to commit
a rape." 6 One of the grounds upon which the defendant
challenged his conviction was the court's instruction to the
jury, which stated that testimony regarding the lack of chastity
of the alleged victim "was admitted solely to enable them to
judge of the intention of the prisoner."1 7 The Supreme Court of
Georgia determined this instruction to be error and therefore,
reversed the lower court." 8 The Court held that this evidence
was admissible for additional purposes. First, the Court said
"that evidence of ill fame, of general character for want of
chastity, may be admitted for the further purpose of enabling
the jury to judge of the truth of the material facts stated by
Camp v. State, 3 Ga. 417, 420 (1847).
See, e.g., id. at 422.
114 See, e.g., id. at 421.
115 Id. But see Rex v. Hodgson, 168 Eng. Rep. 765 (1812) (holding that
evidence of sexual relations with other men was not admissible). For one
particularly oft-quoted decision stating that evidence of lack of chastity by
the alleged victim was admissible, see People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192 (N.Y.
1838) ("And will you not more readily infer assent in the practiced Messalina,
in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?").
116 Camp, 3 Ga. at 418.
117 Id. at 420.
118 Id. at 422.
112
113
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her."119 The rules of evidence were determined to be different
in rape cases than in other cases, and the unchastity of a
120
woman was admissible to discredit her only in rape cases.
Furthermore, the Court explicitly states that a woman who is
not a virgin is more likely to consent to intercourse than a
virgin, so that this evidence was admissible to prove a greater
likelihood of consent on her part. 12 1 Thus, the Court reversed
the conviction because this evidence was relevant and
admissible for additional purposes, so the jury instruction was
wrong.122

The admissibility of specific prior acts of indecency was
less certain, however. Most cases held specific acts to be
inadmissible. 123 Two exceptions were occasionally recognized,
allowing for admission of specific prior acts. In one exception,
specific acts occurring shortly before the alleged rape were
For example, in Brown v.
permitted as evidence.
124
the court held it to be error to refuse
Commonwealth,
evidence that the complaining woman had permitted other
men, shortly before the incident, to "put[] their hands under
her clothes and feel[] her person."'125 This evidence was
admissible because it was relevant to show that "she more
likely consented to the intercourse.' 1 26 The other exception
allowed for specific evidence to be inquired into from the
prosecutrix on the witness stand. This exception required the
defendant to accept her answers however, as contradiction of
her answers was only permitted to prove prior instances with
the defendant. 127 Thus, in Regina v. Cockcroft128 the defendant
was permitted to ask the complainant if she "ever had
connection before with other men," but not to call witnesses to

119 Id. at 420.
120 Id. at 420, 421.
121 Camp, 3 Ga. at 422.
122

Id.

123 See, e.g., id. at 422.
124 43 S.W. 214 (Ky. 1897).
125 Id. at 214.
126

Id.

127 See, e.g., Regina v. Cockcroft, 11 Cox's Crim. L. Cases 410, 411 (1870).
128 Id.
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rebut her testimony. 129 The judge also stated, however, that
inquiry into whether she had engaged in any previous actions
involving the defendant was permissible and a negative
response could be contradicted by other witnesses. 130
2. Evidentiary Requirements
Non-consent of the alleged victim was not sufficient to
establish the crime of rape. 13 1 Moreover, testimony of the
complainant was also not sufficient by itself to convict a man of
rape. 132 The corroborating evidence discussed in previous
periods was still required. 133
Additionally, a new focus
developed during this period, which mandated the woman to
resist the man to the utmost of her ability. Two cases shall be
examined to demonstrate these evidentiary requirements.
In Oleson v. State, 34 the defendant's conviction for rape
was reversed due to the insufficiency of the evidence. 135 The
only evidence in support of the claim was the testimony of "the
prosecuting witness."'136 The court quoted from a number of
opinions, establishing presumptions based on the existence, or
nonexistence, of corroborating factors in the case and the
requirement that the alleged victim resist either "to the
utmost" or at least "to the extent of her ability" in the
circumstances. 137 The court then applied the factors to the
case: she did not cry out for the neighbors to hear, there were
no tears in her clothes, and she testified that she had no marks
upon her person. 138
This evidence "fail[ed to show such
resistance on her part as [would] warrant a conviction for
rape."'139 She did complain the next day, but the lower court
129 Id.
130 Id.

Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644, 648 (1897).
Mathews v. State, 27 N.W. 234, 236 (Neb. 1886).
133 See supra Part I.A.
131

132

134

9 N.W. 38 (Neb. 1881).

Id. at 39, 40.
136 Id. at 39.
135

137

Id.

Id. at 39-40.
139 Oleson, 9 N.W. at 40.
138
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had allowed the details of the complaint to be admitted into
evidence, which was reversible error. 140
The fact that
complaint had been made was admissible, but the details of the
complaint were not.' 4 ' Thus, based on the admission of the
details of the complaint and the lack of other evidence
sufficient to sustain the verdict, the conviction was reversed,
142
and the case was remanded.
Another exemplary case of an appellate court reversing
a conviction for rape based on insufficient evidence is Mathews
v. State.143 The defendant made two charges of error which are
relevant and based upon which, the verdict was reversed.
First, the defendant claimed "that the verdict [was] not
sustained by the evidence."'144 The only testimony supporting
the verdict was that of the prosecutrix. 145 In her testimony, she
stated that she would not sleep with a man who was not her
husband and that she "used all the strength [she] had to get
away from him, but could not."'146 In the opinion, the court
reviewed this testimony and set out the applicable case law,
establishing the resistance rule. 47 The court then provided the
reason for the rule: few women would admit to consenting to
"illicit intercourse," and women would no doubt allege rape if
"mere refusal to give express assent was sufficient to establish
the crime."'148 The court then stated that if the defendant
testifies and denies the charge and there is no corroborating
evidence, in the form of marks on her person or clothing or
evidence that a complaint was "made at the first opportunity,"
then the prosecutrix's testimony alone is insufficient. 49 In this
case, "the testimony failed to show such resistance on the part
of the prosecutrix as would constitute the offense."'150 The

140

141

Id.
Id.

142 Id.

143

27 N.W. 234 (Neb. 1886).

144

Id. at 234.

145 Id.

146 Id. at 234, 235.
147 Id. at 235.
148

Mathews, 27 N.W. at 236.

149 Id.
150

Id.
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second error alleged that "[t]here [was] no corroborating
evidence whatever." 15 1 When the accused denied the charge in
his testimony, corroborating evidence was required. 152 The
prosecutrix in the case had not attempted to corroborate her
testimony, so "her evidence alone could not have been
sufficient."'153 Therefore, the case was reversed due to lack of
54
evidence supporting the verdict.
3.

Constructive Consent

An interesting, and recurrent, problem arises in rape
cases due to the requirements of non-consent and/or resistance
- the issue of whether fraud or other factors can vitiate the
need to adhere to these requirements. The most common
situation in which this problem surfaced occurred when a man
would climb into a married woman's bed and engage in
intercourse with her under the pretense of being her
husband. 55 The following example displays how this fraud
occurred and the legal system's response to it.

152

Id.
Id. at 237.

153

Mathews, 27 N.W.at 237.

154

Id. at 238.

151

This problem also arose in other contexts, wherein isolated cases held that
fraudulent conduct was found to supplant the requirement of resistance. See
Regina v. Dee, 15 Cox's Crim. L. Cases 579 (Ireland 1884) (finding the
defendant guilty of rape for obtaining intercourse by pretending to be the
woman's husband); Regina v. Flattery, 2 L. Rep. 410 (Q.B.D. 1877) (affirming
conviction for rape when intercourse was procured by the fraud of pretending
to perform a medical examination); Regina v. Mayers, 12 Cox's Crim. L.
Cases 311 (1872) (refusing to require resistance when the victim was asleep
at the time of the rape) and Regina v. Camplin, 1 Cox's Crim. L. Cases 220
(1845) (finding that continued resistance was unnecessary when the
defendant purposefully made the victim, who had been resisting, drunk,
knowing it would make her incapable of continued resistance). It should be
noted, though, that the Irish court offers little assistance in most fraud cases,
because it based its holding on a determination that marital and non-marital
intercourse are qualitatively different, so that consent to marital intercourse
does not provide consent to non-marital intercourse. See Regina v. Dee, 15
Cox's Crim. L. Cases 579 (Ireland 1884). The majority of courts found that
fraud did not constitute rape, however. See, e.g., Regina v. Barrow, 19 L.T.R.
293 (1868); Regina v. Williams, 173 Eng. Rep. 497 (1838); Regina v.
155
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In Regina v. Clarke,156 the prosecutrix had gone to bed
at 9:30 in the evening, expecting her husband to return home
later that night. 157 At 2:30 in the morning, she awoke when a
man, whom she assumed was her husband, got into bed with
her.' 58 She fell asleep again, but ten minutes later was
awakened by his attempts to engage in intercourse.' 59 She,
believing the man to be her husband, consented. 160 She fell
asleep again afterwards, and twenty minutes later, she awoke
a third time to find that the man was the defendant, who then
fled.' 61 The defendant was found guilty by a jury, but was also
found to have "intended to have connection with her
fraudulently, but not by force, and, if detected, to desist.' 62
The conviction was reversed because she consented and did not
resist. 163
C. Turn of the Twentieth Century Through 1970
The first three-fourths of the twentieth century entailed
a substantial continuation of the policies and concepts behind
rape law from the nineteenth century. At least one important
shift in judicial thinking occurred, however. During this
period, appellate judges considered it an affirmative duty in
rape cases "not only to carefully consider the evidence but to
reverse the judgment if the evidence is not sufficient to remove
all reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt and is not

sufficient to create an abiding conviction that he is guilty of the
crime charged."'164 By itself, this is not a change from the
nineteenth century - appellate courts had already reversed

Saunders, 173 Eng. Rep. 488 (1838); Rex v. Jackson, 168 Eng. Rep. 487
(1822).
156 169 Eng. Rep. 397 (1854).
157 Id. at 398.
158 Id.

159 Id.
160 I[d.
'Ir

Clarke, 169 Eng. Rep. at 398.

162 Id.

163 Id.

164 People v. Scott, 95 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ill. 1950) (citing People v. Abbate, 181
N.E. 615, 617 (Ill. 1932)).
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convictions due to insufficient evidence. 165 The difference,
however, was that appellate courts in the twentieth century

reviewed not only the sufficiency of the evidence, but the
credibility of the evidence also. Thus, the following two cases
are examples of the regular practice of appellate courts to go
behind a trial court's findings to overturn a conviction because
the appellate judges did not believe the evidence offered by the
prosecution.
One typical occurrence can be found in Mares v.
Territory,'1 66

in

which

the

defendant's

conviction

was

overturned and a new trial was ordered due to "slight," "weak,"
"insufficient," and "doubtful" evidence. 167 The defendant in the
case worked in a butcher shop with a main room and a side
room.

68

The prosecutrix alleged that after he waited on her,

the accused came around the counter, locked the door, pushed
her into the side room, and raped her. 169 The woman, however,
did not cry out, had no marks upon her or her clothing, and did
70
not complain until she had a miscarriage four months later.
The court stated that "the probability of the commission of the
alleged offense [was] so far outside of the domain of reason that
there was absolutely nothing for the consideration of the jury
71
except the bare improbable statement of the prosecutrix."'
The opinion provides a number of factors which were "not
probable": that an employee would commit rape at a time when
customers came to the store, that the victim would not cry out
or resist, that she would not complain sooner, and that she
would not blame someone else for her transgression (premarital sex was considered to be immoral). 172 Emphasis was
placed on the lack of outcry by the alleged victim. Although the
prosecutrix testified that she "didn't say anything at all,
because he told [her] not to say anything, because if [she] did

165 See supra Part I.B.2.
166 65 P. 165 (N.M. 1901).

167 1d. at 168.
168 Id. at 165.
169

Id.

170 Id.

171 Mares, 65 P. at 165.
172

Id.
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say anything he would kill [her] ,"73 the court gave no weight to
174
the alleged threat "in the light of her subsequent testimony."
As "feminine nature" and "feminine tendency" made an outcry
"intuitive and natural," the finding that she did not cry out was
important. 175 Emphasis was also placed upon the "absolute
lack of testimony ...to show any resistance on the part of the
prosecutrix."'176 Although she testified that she "told him he
was a rough fellow; [she] pushed him back and would kick at
him, and done the best [she] could to defend [her]self,"'177 the
court found no evidence "that the sexual act was by force or
against her will."' 78 Her own testimony even worked against
her: "there is some of the testimony of the prosecutrix too
vulgar to be repeated. It indicates such a degree of familiarity
with the depraved parlance of the street and brothel that the
conclusion is imperative that she had an experience of the
world not limited to the single alleged incident at the butcher
shop."' 79 Thus, the evidence was "so slight, so weak, and so
insufficient, and much of it [was] so doubtful, and all of it
without a corroborating circumstance," the conviction was set
80
aside, and a new trial was ordered.1
Another representative case can be found in People v.
Scott,1 1 which overturned another conviction for rape, but this
time actually reversing and not remanding the decision. In the
case, three defendants were charged with rape. 8 2 After they
waived a jury trial, the judge found two defendants not guilty
and convicted the third, who was sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment. 8 3 The last defendant was the owner of a
furniture store, above which was his apartment, and the two
other defendants were his employees.l 4 The prosecution's
173
174
1 75

176

Id. at 166.
Id.
Id.

Mares, 65 P. at 166.

177 Id.
1 78

Id.

179

Id. at 167.

180 Id. at 168.
181 People v. Scott, 95 N.E.2d 315 (Ill.
1950).
182 Id. at 316.
183
Id.
184 Id.
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theory of the case was that the prosecutrix went to the store for
furniture, was told that it was in storage on the second floor,
and was held captive there for thirty-seven hours, during
which time she was beaten and raped.1 8 5 The defendant denied
that any intercourse had occurred at all. 8 6 The appellate court
first stated that it had a duty "to reverse the judgment if the
evidence is not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt of the
87
defendant's guilt" and then proceeded to review the evidence.
The prosecutrix had testified that while upstairs, she became
frightened, called for help out a window, and then "was beaten
for ten minutes and threatened with death."'1 8 The defendant
then coerced her into having two drinks of whiskey,
undressing, and taking a bath. 8 9 Next, she was led into the
bedroom, where they had sexual relations for five hours. 190 The
court, evaluating this testimony, stated that "it is clear that,
however reluctantly begun, the sexual acts were engaged in
without any resistance whatsoever on the part of the
prosecutrix."'19 The court found that her lack of resistance was
not excused because she had the power to resist him and was
not overcome by his superior strength. The fact that she slept
in his bed after the alleged attack also was inconsistent with
"the conduct of a chaste and injured woman" who had just been
raped. 192 Furthermore, although a police officer and a state
attorney testified that she had complained to them on the day
she left his apartment, the fact that a doctor, her cab driver,
and her brother and mother did not testify weakened the
credibility of her case. 193 Other "improbabilities" were also
cited by the court: business was occurring in the store, she was
alone at one point in the apartment, and she stayed for two
nights, cooking and cleaning. 9 4 Therefore, the court concluded
185 Id.
186

Scott, 95 N.E.2d at 316.

187

Id.

188

Id. at 317.

189 Id.
190 Id.

191 Scott, 95 N.E.2d at 317.
192 Id.
193
194

Id. at 318.
Id.
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that her conduct was "inconceivable and inconsistent with the
195
conduct of one whose womanhood had just been outraged."
Finally, the court held that "no good purpose could be served by
196
a new trial," so reversed the case outright, without remand.
II. RISE OF THE RAPE SHIELD LAWS IN THE 1970s AND 1980s

During the 1970s, rape law began to be regarded as
97
protecting a woman's autonomy, not her chastity.1
Recognizing this progressive mentality, some courts began to
show potential for significant success of reform efforts in rape.
Greater promise came near the end of the decade with the
passage of "rape shields" laws. This promise never really
materialized, however, due to unfortunate side effects of the
rape shield laws. This section will explore each of these
developments in turn.
A. Progress in the Courts
Beginning a few years before the enactment of the
federal rape shield statute, some courts started abandoning the
prejudices and biases in rape law. Two years prior to the
enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals even "held that rape offenses are
not inherently different from other crimes and consequently
abrogated the legal requirement of corroboration of the
complaining witness' testimony."' 98 Two cases demonstrating
this process will be discussed.
One of the first cases to discuss the merits of rapespecific requirements, such as a cautionary jury instruction
and mandatory corroboration of the complainant's testimony,
was People v. Rincon-Pineda.199 The defendant's sole ground
for appeal of his rape conviction was the refusal of the trial
judge to give a mandatory cautionary jury instruction based on
195 Id.

196 Scott,

95 N.E.2d at 319.

See Rodes, supra note 14, at 686-88.
198 McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74, 79 (D.C. 1977) (citing Arnold v.
United States, 358 A.2d 335, 344 (D.C. 1976)).
199 538 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1975).
197
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the statements of Lord Hale. 200 In the case, the alleged victim
testified that she was awakened at approximately 3 a.m.,
screamed, turned on a light, and discovered the man lying
beside her was the defendant. 201 She ordered him to leave and
then began screaming. 20 2 She tried to run away; he caught her
in the kitchen. 203 He beat her in the face to stop her screaming
and then choked her. 20 4 She stopped resisting, believing her

life to be in danger. 205 She coaxed him into a different room, to
get away from the knives, and submitted to a dozen sexual
acts. 206 Finally, she persuaded him to leave by convincing him
she had to go to work, at which time he warned her not to
report the rape. 207 After he left, she went and talked to a
friend. 208 A few hours later, she returned with the police
whereupon the defendant was arrested (he lived in the house
next to hers). 209 Upon arrest, the defendant had scratches on
his forehead. 210 Later that day, she went to a doctor, who
testified she had bruises all over her body. 211 At the police
station, the defendant stated that he had been very drunk and
did not remember what had happened. 212 No other evidence,
scientific or otherwise, was introduced to support the victim's

allegation. 21 3 The defendant testified that he had left his wife
behind in Mexico, was faithful to her, and had been drinking
with friends during the day.214 None of the friends testified as
they had allegedly fled out of fear of deportation.215 However,
the landlord did testify that the defendant had been
Id. at 249. The judge refused the instruction because "he considered it
demeaning of the victim in the instant case." Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.

200

203 Id.

Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d at 249.
Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 250.
208 Id.
204

205

20

9 Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d at 250.

2 10

Id.

211 Id.
212 Id.
213
214
2 15

Id. at 251.
Rincon-Pineda,538 P.2d at 251.
Id.
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drinking. 216 The jury convicted him of rape. 217 The defendant,
however, objected to the judge's refusal to give the instruction
that the charge is easy to make and difficult to defend so "the
law requires that you examine the testimony of the female
person named in the information with caution."218 The court
acknowledged that, based on prior precedent, 219 the refusal to
give the instruction was error - the instruction was mandatory
and the lower court could not refuse to give it without a ruling
by the higher court. 220 However, it held that the error was not
221
prejudicial in this case.
The court then proceeded to examine the cautionary
instruction to determine whether its use had continuing
validity. First, the court recognized the increase in protections
given to the accused, noting that "the spectre of wrongful
conviction, whether for rape or for any other crime, has led our
society to arm modern defendants with the potent
accouterments of due process which render the additional
22 2
constraints of Hale's caution superfluous and capricious."
Second, the court evaluated the claim that the charge is
unusually difficult to defend against. The court found that it
was not for a number of reasons: (1) "jur[ies] choosef to
redefine the crime of rape in terms of [their] notions of
assumption of risk,' such that juries will frequently acquit a
rapist or convict him of a lesser offense, notwithstanding clear
evidence of guilt";22 3 (2) rapes are grossly underreported, for a
variety of reasons; 2 24 (3) many rapes "are deemed 'unfounded'

by the police and are pursued no further;" 225 (4) even if an
arrest is made, it may not go any further; 226 and (5) the
prosecution rarely relies solely on the evidence of the
2 16

2 17

Id.
Id.

218

Id. at 252.

219

Rincon-Pineda,538 P.2d at 249.

220 Id.

221 Id. at 252, 253.
222 Id. at 257.
223
Id. at 258 (quoting KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 254 (1966)).
224 Rincon-Pineda,538 P.2d at 258 (quoting KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 254 (1966)).
225 Id. at 259.
226

Id.
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complainant. 227 Finally, the court disapproved of allowing the
instruction even discretionarily. 228 The court reasoned that
because sexual assault charges, including rape, were "no more
easily made or harder to defend against than many other
classes of charges," the complainant's credibility should be
"deemed no more suspect" than other complainants. 229 Instead,
the court decided to "reaffirm and reinforce the existing
instructions as to the credibility of witnesses which must
2 30
presently be given."
This line of reasoning was extended in State ex rel. Pope
v. Superior Court.231 The controversy came before the Arizona
Supreme Court by way of a "special action requesting that [the]
Court reconsider existing law on the admissibility of evidence
concerning the unchaste character of a complaining witness in
a prosecution for first degree rape."232 The action was brought
by a county attorney after the judge had "reluctantly denied
petitioner's motion in limine to bar the admission of such
evidence." 233 The Court first addressed whether chastity
evidence could be admitted to attack the credibility of the
prosecutrix. 234 This issue was disposed of quickly as "[t]he law
does not and should not recognize any necessary connection
235
between a witness' veracity and her sexual immorality."
Furthermore, if her reputation for chastity was that bad, there
would be other evidence "to prove that she had a bad
reputation for truth and veracity." 236
The Court then
considered the more difficult question of whether unchastity
227

22

Id.

8 Id.at 260.

229 Id.
230

Rincon-Pineda,538 P.2d at 260.

545 P.2d 946 (Ariz. 1976); see also McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74
(D.C. App. 1977) (finding that evidence of prior sexual acts of the
complainant is inadmissible regarding her credibility except in unusual
circumstances, that reputation evidence should rarely be admitted to show
her consent, and that the specific evidence of prior acts with the defendant
was properly admitted).
232 Pope, 545 P.2d at 948.
231

233

Id.

234

Id. at 950.

235

Id.
Id.

236
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evidence should be admitted when the defense of consent is
introduced. 2 7
The Court again found the evidence
inadmissible. 238 The Court compared evidence of unchastity to
239
other prior bad acts of a witness, which are not permitted.
These acts diverted attention from the real issues of the case,
and "[t]he fact that a woman consented to sexual intercourse on
one occasion is not substantial evidence that she consented on
another, but in fact may indicate the contrary."240 The Court
recognized that there were exceptions, such as when the
evidence would contradict evidence of "the victims alleged loss
241
of virginity, the origin of semen, disease or pregnancy."
Reputation evidence was also barred because it "deals with
collateral matters and thus is of limited probative value, tends
to unduly prejudice jurors' minds and is almost impossible to
effectively rebut."242 There were two exceptions to this rule, for
purposes of rebutting evidence introduced by the prosecution
and for cases involving a charge of attempted rape, "where the
243
subjective intent of the assailant is an element of the crime."
Finally, the Court held that evidence of prostitution could be
admitted if the defendant claimed the alleged victim consented
to an act of prostitution and it was offered "to show that the
complaining witness has made unsubstantiated charges of rape
in the past."244 Therefore, because the case at bar did not
involve any of the exceptions discussed, the character evidence
of the prosecutrix was not admissible in the case. 245

B. Creation of Rape Shield Laws
While the cases above were being decided, state and
federal legislatures were debating statutory reforms to the
rules of evidence. These efforts resulted in four variations of
237

Pope, 545 P.2d at 951.

238
239

Id. at 953.
Id. at 952.

240

Id.

241

Id. at 953.

Pope, 545 P.2d at 953.
Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
242
243
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rape shield laws. 246 These four can be characterized as the
federal approach, 24 7 the Michigan approach, 248 the Texas
approach, 249 and the California approach. 2 50 The Michigan
approach is the most restrictive, permitting admission of the
251
victim's past sexual conduct only in two specific situations
and only if the alleged rapist followed strict procedural
Due to the stringent requirements and
requirements. 252
limited exceptions allowing for admissibility, it has been
declared unconstitutional in particular applications. 253 The
Texas approach is the most permissive, providing for additional
exceptions to the general ban, requiring only that the
evidence's probative value outweigh the danger of unfair
prejudice to be admissible, and not imposing any deadlines on
the party desiring to offer the evidence. 254 Thus, the Texas
approach provides trial courts with "nearly unfettered
discretion to admit sexual conduct evidence." 255 The California
approach bifurcates the question into two categories - evidence
introduced to prove consent and evidence introduced to attack
credibility. 256 This approach is difficult to apply due to a
number of ambiguities inherent in the statute. 257 The federal
approach is a combination of the restrictive and permissive
For purposes of clarity and brevity, the
approaches. 258
See generally Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and
Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763
246

(1986) (analyzing and critiquing the four approaches to rape shield statutes,
and suggesting an alternative approach).
247 FED. R. EVID. 412.
248 MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.520j (2005).
249

TEX.EVID. R. 412.

CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (Deering 2005).
Past sexual conduct with the actor and to prove a different source of
semen, pregnancy, or disease. Both exceptions require relevance to a
material fact at issue and the prejudicial nature of the evidence does not
outweigh its probative value.
252 See Galvin, supra note 246, at 773-74; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.520j (2005).
253 See Galvin, supra note 246, at 773.
254 See TEX. EVID.R. 412; see also Galvin, supra note 246, at 774.
255 See Galvin, supra note 246, at 774.
250
251

256

Id.

257 Id.
258

Id.
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remainder of this Article will focus on the federal approach,
although the discussion generally applies equally to all of the
approaches.
The federal approach was enacted in 1978, as Federal
Rule of Evidence 412.259 The rule is separated into three
subsections: a general rule, exceptions to the rule, and a
260
procedure for determining admissibility of sexual evidence.
The general rule establishes a presumptive ban, in both civil
and criminal cases, on evidence of an alleged victim's previous
sexual behavior and sexual predisposition. 261 In criminal cases,
however, so long as the evidence is not prohibited by another
rule,262 evidence of specific instances of conduct is admissible to
prove a different "source of semen, injury or other physical
evidence;" 26 3 specific instances with the defendant are
admissible when offered by the defense to prove consent or by
the prosecution; 264 and any evidence is admissible if required to
protect the defendant's constitutional rights. 265 In civil cases,
the exception from the rule encompasses any evidence for
which the "probative value substantially outweighs the danger
266
of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party,"
except that reputation evidence must be "placed in controversy
by the alleged victim" before it may be admitted. 267 Finally, the
rule requires that any party desiring to introduce sexual
evidence pursuant to an exception to the rule must "file a
written motion at least 14 days before trial" or at other times
as permitted or required by the court, 268 the party must "serve
the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim," 269 and

259 For purposes of this discussion, the rule will be analyzed in its current
form,
resulting from amendments in 1988 and 1994.
260

FED. R. EVID. 412
R. EVID. 412(a).
262 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
261 FED.
263

FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A).

264 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B).

FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(1)(C).
R. EvID. 412(b)(2).
267 Id.
268 FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1)(A).
269 FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(1)(B).
265

266 FED.
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an in camera hearing must be held to determine whether the
270
evidence should be admitted.
A few comments from the Congressional discussion of
H.R. 4727, which became Federal Rule of Evidence 412, shed
some additional light on the purposes and intention of the rule.
First, "the principal purpose of [the] legislation [was] to protect
rape victims from the degrading and embarrassing disclosure
of intimate details about their private lives." 27 1 It was noted
that rape was "the least reported crime" and that the "trials
become inquisitions into the victim's morality, not trials of the
defendant's innocence or guilt." 272 Second, the intent and
breadth of the exceptions was discussed. The constitutional
exception was expected to apply only in "infrequent
instances." 273 The other two exceptions were both to remain
subject to the usual requirements that the evidence must be
"relevant and that its probative value outweighs the danger of
unfair prejudice." 274 The in camera hearing was designed to
provide the defendant with an opportunity to argue for the
admissibility of the evidence while still protecting the privacy
of the alleged victim. 275 Finally, the expectations were that this
type of "evidence [would] be admitted only in clearly and
narrowly defined circumstances and only after an in camera
hearing" 276 and that all of the circumstances surrounding the
277
evidence would be considered.
C. Application of the Rape Shield Rules
The rape shield statutes represent a laudable attempt
at alleviating the historical prejudices and biases against rape
complainants - that women make up complaints, must fight to
protect their chastity, need corroborating evidence, do not
submit prior to penetration, and are more likely to consent to

271

R. EVID. 412(c)(2).
124 CONG. REC. H11945 (Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).

272

Id.

270 FED.

273 Id.
274 Id.

275

See id.

276

124 CONG. REc. H11945 (Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).

277

See id.
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sex if they have engaged in it previously. However, the
effectiveness of the rule to accomplish this purpose can only be
determined by evaluating the cases in which it has been
applied. The following case demonstrates that although the
rule has improved the situation, it has significant shortcomings
and has produced some unfortunate consequences.
An example of the unfortunate effect of this rule arose
in 1981. In Doe v. United States,278 the Fourth Circuit held
that "reputation and opinion evidence of the past sexual
behavior of an alleged victim" was admissible when proffered
for the purpose of showing the defendant's state of mind. 279 In
the case, a Rule 412 pre-trial hearing had been conducted, and
the trial judge ruled that the proffered evidence was
admissible. 28 0 The alleged victim appealed the ruling. 28 ' The
defendant argued that the evidence was "admissible to support
his claim that the victim consented, to show the reasonableness
of his belief that she consented, and to corroborate his
testimony."2 8 2 The Court partially agreed and upheld the
admission of some of the proffered evidence, stating that the
defendant's "knowledge, acquired before the alleged crime, of
the victim's past sexual behavior is relevant on the issue of
[his] intent."283
This evidence included
"telephone
had with the victim,"284
[defendant]
conversations that
testimony of men who informed the defendant that the alleged
victim was promiscuous, and a love letter she had written to
another man, to the extent that "this evidence [was] introduced
to corroborate the existence of the conversations and the
letter."2 85 This evidence was allowed because the court
determined that the rule did not apply to evidence offered to
prove the intent of the defendant, the admissibility therefore

278 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981).
279
Id. at 48.
280 Id. at 45, 47.
281 The procedural history which permitted this appeal is not relevant to this
discussion. For a discussion of that history, see id. at 45-46.
282 Id. at 47.
283 Doe, 666 F.2d. at 48.
284 Id. at 47, 49.
285 Id. at 48.
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depended on the general rules of evidence, and the court
28 6
determined that this evidence was relevant.
The unfortunate effect of the rape shield law arises from
the acceptance of the defendant's argument in this case - that
an erroneous belief that the victim consented to his advances
absolved him of liability.
Prior to abandonment of the
resistance requirement in the 1970s, this argument would not
have been tenable. 28 7 The resistance requirement prevented
the defendant from having a reasonable belief that the alleged
victim consented because physical resistance destroyed any
chance of having a "reasonable" belief. This, in and of itself, is
not truly problematic, although it is an unfortunate side effect
of abandoning this requirement. The problem develops from
the consequences of legitimizing this argument.
Judicial validation of this argument is problematic for
three primary reasons. First, it presents a backdoor method of
introducing the evidence that Congress (and state legislatures)
had attempted to prohibit; in effect, it permits this evidence in
all cases where the defendant can make a colorable claim that
he knew of the information prior to the incident. This means
that evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct would be
admitted if the alleged attacker claims that he knew about the
conduct before the alleged rape. Even though there may be no
question as to whether the woman actually consented or that
sexual activity occurred, evidence of the woman's prior sexual
conduct would be introduced into evidence. Thus, the rationale
and determination underlying the rape shield statutes, that
this type of evidence has low probative value and is highly
prejudicial, fails to exclude the evidence merely because the
defendant claims that he knew about it.
Second, it declares that this evidence is relevant to the
stated purpose - to show that the alleged rapist had a
"reasonable belief' that the alleged victim consented. This is
hard to harmonize with the understandings of the legislatures
that this evidence is generally not relevant, or is at least
unduly prejudicial. Whether the defendant knew of past sexual
experiences of the alleged victim or not has no bearing on
2 86

Id.

287

See Rodes, supra note 14, at 690-91.
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whether she consented to sex with him on this occasion. It may
bear on his belief that she would have sex with him, but it
seems hard to imagine that he could have a reasonable belief
that she would agree to it if she told him no. If the woman
resists, this should prevent any "reasonable belief' in consent,
no matter what the alleged rapist has heard about her. Unless
she told him that she wanted to feign resistance on this
occasion, resistance on her part must present a sign to the
reasonable man that she does not consent, thereby preventing
any possibility of a "reasonable belief" defense. Furthermore, if
she says no to an offer to engage in intercourse, this also must
negate any argument in a "reasonable belief' of consent. If
resisting or saying no is insufficient, and the contention that
the accused rapist had heard about past conduct by the alleged
victim that led him to believe she was consenting despite
resisting or saying no and therefore cannot be held liable is
upheld, then evidence of a woman's past sexual conduct could
never be precluded from a rape trial.
An illustration of this problem can be found in the 1974
case of R v. Morgan.28 8 In that case, the prosecutrix's husband
had told three of his co-workers that they should have
intercourse with his wife. 2 89 He said that she liked sexually
deviate conduct and provided them with contraceptives. 290 The
other men also averred that he told them to expect resistance
by his wife, but that it was merely a method of self-arousal for
her and was not serious. 291 The four men, including the
husband, had intercourse with her.292 She struggled and
screamed throughout. 293 The men claimed at trial that any
resistance by the prosecutrix was "no more than playacting"
and that she had consented. 294 The trial judge instructed the
jury that a defendant could not be guilty if he reasonably and
honestly believed that the alleged victim had consented, even if

288

[1976] AC 182 (H.L.).

289 Id.
290 Id.

291

Id.

292

Id.
R v. Morgan, [1976] AC 182 (H.L).
Id. at 186.

293
294
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it was proved that she had not actually done so. 295
Furthermore, the burden was on the prosecution to prove that
the defendant did not reasonably believe that the woman had
consented. 296 The House of Lords upheld this instruction as an
accurate summation of the law, thereby upholding the defense
of reasonable belief of consent in this case. 297 Thus, this
decision shows that a man who had no personal or direct
experience with a woman can rely on any information from any
source, whether the information is true or not and without
investigating its accuracy, to engage in intercourse with a
woman. Then, even if the woman were to resist his advances,
he could be found not guilty of rape, merely because someone
had told him a rumor about a woman or had lied about her past
behavior. Worse yet, even if the woman had previously feigned
resistance to intercourse which she actually consented to, it
does not mean that she is doing so on the occasion in question.
Therefore, relying on a past episode, even if true, should not
matter because otherwise, the woman would never be able to
say no. If she had once consented when feigning resistance,
she could never again rely on resistance as a method to convey
non-consent and would have no method by which to convey
that message. Thus, reliance on past sexual conduct of the
alleged victim cannot provide a "reasonable belief' in consent,
so it should not be admitted, and even if it could so provide, the
same policy reasons precluding past sexual conduct evidence
from admissibility to show consent apply in the realm of a
"reasonable belief' in consent.
Finally, the "reasonable belief' argument displays the
effect that shifting the focus of the admissibility inquiry can
have. Without the rape shield statute, the inquiry would
consist of applying the general rules of evidence to the facts of
the case. Therefore, the evidence would have to be relevant
(Rule 401), not prejudicial (403), offered for a valid purpose
(404-406), and not hearsay (801-803). With the rape shield
statute, however, the inquiry focuses on the applicability of
that statute and the admissibility of the evidence under that
295

Id.at 187.

296

Id.
Id. at 183.

297

112

BUFFALO JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY

Vol. XVIII

statute. Therefore, other rules of evidence can be overlooked or
neglected. In Doe for example, the court began by considering
298
whether Rule 412 applied, which it decided in the negative.
The court then determined that the evidence was relevant, but
299
the analysis stopped there; the court admitted the evidence.
It never applied Federal Rule of Evidence 403, thereby
300 It
overlooking any possible unfair prejudice under that rule.
also never considered whether the evidence was excluded by a
different rule. 301 Thus, because the focus becomes distracted by
the rape shield, other rules which could be important are
disregarded.
III. FROM RAPE SHIELD LAWS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY

Other issues regarding the rape shield laws have arisen
over the last fifteen years. These issues include whether
evidence may be precluded by the rape shield laws' procedural
requirements despite the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause; 30 2 the correlative question of whether evidence may be
precluded by the rape shield laws' substantive requirements
despite the Confrontation Clause; 30 3 and whether Rule 412,
imposing a general ban, subject to limited exceptions, on past
sexual conduct evidence, applies in any given case. 30 4 While
the courts were busy addressing these issues produced by Rule
412, Congress produced additional rules to help alleged victims
of rape: Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415. These rules permit
introduction of prior acts of sexual assault and child
See Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 48 (4th Cir. 1981).
See id.
300 See id. ("Certainly, the victim's conversations with [defendant] are
relevant, and they are not the type of evidence that the rule excludes."
'Therefore, its admission is governed by the Rules of Evidence dealing with
relevancy in general.").
301 See id.
302 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.");
see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
303 See Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696 (Pa. 1992).
304 See People v. Ivers, 587 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 1998); Commonwealth v.
Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696 (Pa. 1992).
298

299
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molestation by the alleged attacker, and they were designed to
help victims by easing the restrictions placed on the
admissibility of evidence of prior sexual assaults by the alleged
rapist. 30 5 This section will explore these developments and
their consequences and present two case studies using the
Mike Tyson 30 6 and Kobe Bryant 30 7 trials.
A. Issues with Rule 412
Three main issues arose from the application of Rule
412 during this period. First, the rule conflicts with the Sixth
Amendment as it operates in many situations to prevent a
defendant in a criminal case from fully questioning, and
therefore confronting, the accusing witness. Second, there was
a correlative issue of whether the evidence prohibited by Rule
412 could nonetheless be introduced for impeachment purposes
to show that the prosecutrix's testimony was either
contradictory or based on an ulterior motive or bias. Finally, a
preliminary issue of whether evidence falls within the purview
of Rule 412 developed.
The overarching concerns about the conflict between
Rule 412's procedural requirements and the Sixth Amendment
were addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Michigan v. Lucas.30 8 In the case, the defendant allegedly
forced his ex-girlfriend into his apartment at knifepoint, and
then he forced "her to engage in several nonconsensual sex
acts."30 9 The defendant had not filed a motion, required by the
Michigan rape shield statute to be filed within ten days of his
arraignment, stating his desire to admit evidence of his prior
sexual relationship with the alleged victim. 310 At the trial, the
accused relied on a defense of consent, but because of the
failure to comply with the statutory requirements, he was not

See FED. R. EVID. 413-15; see also United States v. Bird, 372 F.3d 989 (8th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Bull, 32 Fed. App'x 778 (8th Cir. 2002).
306 Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind.Ct. App. 1993).
307 See Bryant Complaint, supra note 20.
308 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
305

309

Id. at 147.

310

Id. at 146, 147.
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permitted to offer this evidence.3 11 He was found guilty in a
bench trial.312 The Michigan Court of Appeals held the statute
to be unconstitutional when it prohibited prior evidence of
"sexual conduct between a rape victim and a criminal
defendant" and therefore, reversed the conviction. 313 The U.S.
Supreme Court accepted the case to consider the per se finding
of unconstitutionality.3 14 The Court began by assuming that
the statute authorized preclusion as a remedy for a violation
and then stated that preclusion "implicate[d] the Sixth
Amendment."3 15 Next, the Court identified a number of valid
purposes that the statute served. 316 Finally, the Court held
that the Sixth Amendment did not forbid preclusion in every
case and that "[f]ailure to comply with [the notice-and-hearing]
requirement may in some cases justify even the severe sanction
of preclusion."317 The Court then remanded the case for
determination by the Michigan courts of first, whether the
statute authorized preclusion and second, whether the ten day
notice period was "overly restrictive." 31 8 Thus, this case shows
that first, it is possible for prior sexual conduct evidence to be
precluded by rape shield statutes under certain conditions and
second, these statutes implicate serious Sixth Amendment
concerns which courts must address, parties must argue, and
cases must include as an issue.
A correlative issue, whether the Sixth Amendment
mandates inclusion of certain substantive evidence banned by
the rape shield laws, was addressed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Spiewak.319 The case
involved a charge against the defendant for "having engaged in
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with his fifteen year old
stepdaughter. '320 The girl testified that prior to her sixteenth
Id. at 147, 148.
Id.
313 Lucas, 500 U.S. at 147, 148.
314Id. at 149.
311

312

3 15
3 16

Id.
1d.

317 Id. at 152, 153.
318

Lucas, 500

U.S. at151, 153.

617 A.2d 696 (Pa. 1992).
320 Id. at 697.
319
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birthday, she came downstairs in the home, tried cocaine
offered by the defendant, allowed him to lick some from her
321
breasts, and that defendant "performed oral sex on her."
Furthermore, after she turned sixteen and after her mother
and stepfather separated, she returned to her former home and
engaged in sexual intercourse with the defendant.3 22 Finally,
she testified that she informed a boy she had dated "that she
had been involved with an older man and had engaged in oral
sex with him." 323 The defendant, on the other hand, testified
that he did have both oral and sexual intercourse with the girl,
but only after her sixteenth birthday and without the use of
drugs. 324 Defendant's counsel twice 325 attempted to introduce
evidence that two years prior to the trial, the girl had testified
at a custody proceeding to having "been seduced by an older
man" and that the "encounter . . . involved not only oral
intercourse but also the use of cocaine." 326 The evidence was
offered first "to impeach her credibility" 327 and again for the
additional purpose of "show[ing] an alternative account of [the
girl's] statement to [her friend] that she had experienced oral
sex with an older man."328 The trial court refused to admit the
evidence because of the rape shield law. 329 The Court reversed,
holding that preclusion of the evidence violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights, particularly in light of the unfair
advantage taken by the prosecution in creating an inference
0
that there was only one older man involved with the girl. 33
The Court stated that "[t]he statute cannot be both shield and
sword" and that "[i]t cannot . . . preclude a defendant from
offering evidence which is so highly probative of the witness's
credibility that such evidence is necessary to allow/permit a
Id.
Id.
323 Id. at 698.
321

322

Spiewak, 617 A.2d at 697.
Once during cross-examination to impeach her credibility and once during
recross-examination to provide an alternate explanation for the girl's
statement to the boy she had dated. Id. at 700.
326
Id.at 698.
324

325

327 Id.

328

Id. at 699.

329

Spiewak, 617 A.2d at 698, 699.
Id. at 701-02.

330
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jury to make a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence." 331 Thus, this case demonstrates that evidence may
not be possible to preclude under the rape shield statutes,
thereby requiring the court to first determine whether the
evidence is barred by the rape shield and then, if so, to further
evaluate the evidence under the Confrontation Clause.
Finally, courts must address the seemingly innocuous
question of whether the rape shield statute even applies to the
case. The case of People v. Ivers332 provides an exemplary case
of how this can become a difficult issue. In the case, the
alleged victim was visiting a friend in college and met the
defendant in her friend's dorm room. 333 Later that night, they
drank beer in the defendant's room and drank more alcohol at
a party.33 4 She testified that she remembered nothing between
leaving the party and realizing that "the defendant was on top
of her with his penis in her vagina." 33 5 The prosecution's
theory was rape and that he "knew or had reason to know that
she was physically incapacitated due to the consumption of
alcohol." 336 The defendant testified that they had kissed on the
way to his apartment; she said she wanted to go the bedroom
with him; and they removed their clothes, got into bed, and had
intercourse. 337 There was evidence supporting both "versions of
the events." 33 8
The issue in the case revolved around
statements allegedly made by the complainant to her friend
earlier in the day: first, that she was ready to have sex and
probably would at college, and second, that she had requested
her friend to 'get her a guy' that night."339 The trial judge
refused the testimony of the friend regarding both statements
as prohibited by the rape shield statute and "absolutely
irrelevant."340 The Court of Appeals reversed finding "the rape331

Id. at 702.

459 Mich. 320 (1998).
333 Id. at 322.
334 Id.
332

335 Id.
336

Id.

337 Ivers, 459
33 8

Mich. at 322-23.
Id. at 323.
339 Id. at 323-24, 325.
340 Id. at 324, 325.
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shield statute inapplicable" because it did not "concern the
complainant's past sexual conduct, opinions about her sexual
conduct or her reputation regarding sexual conduct." 341 The
Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the Court of Appeals,
finding "the proposed testimony outside the scope of the rapeshield statute"342 because "[tihe proposed testimony . . . does
not reveal any prior sexual activity by the complainant."3 43 The
Court basically found that statements could only fall within the
ambit of the rape shield statute if they "amount to or reference
specific conduct." 344 Thus, this case displays how even the
applicability of Rule 412 can be an issue.
B. Protections of Rules 413-415
In 1994, three new evidentiary rules intended to benefit
victims of sexual misconduct were added to the Federal Rules
of Evidence: Rules 413, 414, and 415. 345 Rule 413 makes
"evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault" admissible in criminal sexual
assault cases. 346 The rule also defines "sexual assault"347 and
imposes procedural requirements on the prosecution. 348 Rule
414 mirrors Rule 413, but applies to "offenses of child
molestation." 349 Finally, Rule 415 extends the permissions
350
granted in Rules 413 and 414 to civil cases.
These rules seem to work relatively effectively. An
example of a case where an issue regarding these rules arose
can be found in United States v. Bull.35 1 The defendant in the
case had been found "guilty of three counts of aggravated
Id. at 326.
342 Ivers, 459 Mich. at 328.
341

343 Id.

344 Id. at 329. The court provided phone sex as an example of a statement

which amounted to specific conduct. Id.
345 See FED. R. EvID. 413-415.
346 FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
347 FED. R. EVID. 413(d).
348 FED. R. EVID. 413(b).
349 FED. R. EVID. 414.
35 0
FED. R. EVID. 415.

351

32 Fed. App'x 778 (8th Cir. 2002).
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sexual abuse of a child." 35 2 Amongst his arguments on appeal
was that "the court erred by allowing five witnesses to testify

under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, because the alleged
uncharged acts discussed were unlike the instant charges and
occurred many years ago."3 53 The court quickly disposed of the

argument. First, the court recognized that the rule was
intended "to relax the standard of admissibility for propensity
evidence in sex offense cases," while keeping the evidence
subject to Rule 403.354 Next, the court found that the evidence

was not unfairly prejudicial and that "[m]any similarities"
existed between the acts testified to and the current charged
offense. 355 Finally, the court cited precedent holding that even
twenty years passage of time since the previous events would
not preclude them under Rule 413.356 The court affirmed the
conviction. 357
Although the case does raise a few
considerations, such as whether the conduct is "sexual,"358 that
must be taken into account, there are considerably fewer
additional considerations introduced in a case involving these
rules than in Rule 412. This is because Rules 413-415 do not
invoke problems such as conflicts with the Sixth Amendment
and exclusion of relevant evidence.
C. Two Case Studies
Two rape trials which captured the public's attention
demonstrate many issues which occur in rape cases and the
focus placed on certain issues in rape trials. The two cases
occurred completely in the public spotlight because they
involved sports stars: Mike Tyson in one and Kobe Bryant in
the other. Although the two cases resulted in very different
outcomes, both are instructive regarding the law of rape. The
352

Id. at 779.

353 Id.
35
4 Id.
355 Id.
356 Bull,
357

32 Fed. App'x at 779.

Id. at 780.

358 Id. at 779; see also United States v. Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 991-95 (8th Cir.

2004) (providing a lengthy discussion of what constitutes a "sexual act" or
attempt at "sexual contact").
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first case, which resulted in a conviction, was the trial of Mike
Tyson; 359 the second case, which did not even go to trial,
360
involved charges filed against Kobe Bryant.
1. The Mike Tyson Trial
The state of Indiana charged Mike Tyson with rape
based on events that occurred on July 18 and 19, 1991. In the
case, Tyson met the alleged victim in Indianapolis at a
rehearsal for the Miss Black America pageant. 36 1
The
prosecutrix testified that no advances were made towards her
at this meeting and no agreement to meet again was
arranged. 362 Tyson testified that he told her he would like to
have sex with her and that she agreed. 363 Other pageant
contestants testified that the prosecutrix discussed Tyson's
penis size, his intelligence (or lack thereof), and his wealth
with them; she denied these conversations. 364
The next
morning at 1:30 a.m., Tyson called her from his limousine; he
was leaving the next morning and wanted to spend time with
her. 365 Tyson told the driver to stop at his hotel. 366 He stated
that they were kissing in the limousine; she disagreed and
367
added that they did not hold hands on the way into the hotel.
At the hotel, they both went to his hotel room. 368 He testified
that they engaged in consensual intercourse, but she "had
become annoyed afterward when he refused to escort her
downstairs."369 She testified that she went to the restroom and

359 Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind.App. 1993).
360 See Bryant Complaint, supra note 20.
361 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 442 (7th Cir. 1995). The facts of the case have
been taken from the habeas corpus proceedings on appeal in the Seventh
Circuit, which provides a concise and comprehensive summary of the
differing versions of events. See id. at 442-43.
362 Id. at 442-43.
36 3
Id. at 443.
364 Id.
365
366
367

Id.
Tyson, 50 F.3d at 443.
Id.

36

8 Id.

369

Id.
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when she returned, Tyson was wearing only underwear. 370 She
tried to leave, but "[h]e grabbed her, forcibly removed her
clothes, and raped her."37 1 Her efforts to fight him off were
"like hitting a wall."372 Afterwards, she dressed and left the
hotel. 37 3 The limo driver, who took her back to her hotel,
testified that "she 'rushed toward' the limousine and entered it
'in a state of shock,' 'dazed,' 'disoriented,' 'frantic,"' and saying
that he was "a bad person."374 Tyson's bodyguard booked a
flight at 2 a.m., and "Tyson left his hotel for the airport" at 4
a.m. 375 The prosecutrix told her roommates that Tyson raped
376
her, and she went to a hospital in Indianapolis the next day.
Tyson was convicted "of rape and two counts of criminal
377
deviate conduct."
Tyson's arguments on appeal illustrate the types of
issues that arise and the focus of the trial in rape cases. Four
relevant issues 378 were raised on appeal and will be addressed
here: the refusal to allow witnesses not on Tyson's witness list
to testify, the exclusion of motive evidence arising from past
incidents between the complainant and her parents, the
exclusion of the complainant's prior sexual conduct, and the
37 9
rejection of jury instructions requested by the defense.
The first issue on appeal was the refusal of the trial
court to permit testimony from three witnesses who came
forward with information during the trial. 380 Before the trial,
the judge ordered the defense to disclose relevant information
regarding all witnesses expected to testify to the issue of
consent no later than December 18, 1991.381 The trial began on
Monday, January 27, 1992, and evidence was first introduced
370

Id.

371

Tyson, 50 F.3d at 443.
Id.

372

373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376

Tyson, 50 F.3d at 443.

377 Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 280 (Ind. App. 1993).

Eight issues were raised, but the remaining four are inapplicable to this
discussion. Id.
379 Id.
378

380

Id.

381

Id.
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on Thursday, January 30, 1992.382 That afternoon, the defense
was informed that three women had come forward with
information relevant to the case.3 8 3 A defense attorney "spoke
to one of the women by telephone midday Friday, and had a
face-to-face interview with two of the women . . . on Friday
evening."3 8 4 That night, the attorney informed Tyson's trial
attorneys about these potential witnesses.38 5 The defense did
not inform the prosecution of these women until Sunday
afternoon. 38 6 The trial court did not allow the witnesses to
testify.3 87
The appellate court, in analyzing the
appropriateness of this exclusion, began by stating that the
pre-trial disclosure order created a "continuing duty to disclose
38 8
[the required information] as soon as reasonably possible.
The court then stated that it was reasonable of the trial court
to require notification to the State of the women's potential
testimony by Friday night.38 9 Although the court did not
attribute the delay in notification to bad faith or deliberate
misconduct, the two-day delay in disclosure weighed in favor of
the trial court's exclusion of the testimony. 390 Next, the court
considered the nature of the proffered testimony.3 91 The
testimony of all three witnesses would have shown that they
saw two people in the backseat of the limousine hugging and
kissing, they saw that the man was Mike Tyson when he got
out, and Tyson and the defendant were holding hands on their
way into the hotel.39 2 Two different theories for admission of
this testimony were presented: first, that it was relevant to
whether or not "Tyson might have reasonably believed.., that
[the prosecutrix] consented" and second, "as impeaching
evidence." 393 The court rejected both of these theories. As to
382
383
384

Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 280.
Id. at 280-81.
Id. at 281.

385 Id.
386 Id.

Tyson, 619 N.E.2d. at 281.
Id. at 282.
389
Id. at 283.
390 Id. at 284.
387
388

391
392

Id.

Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 284 n.9, 286.
at 286, 287.

393 Id.
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his belief in her consent, the evidence only tended to show that
the prosecutrix "would consent to sexual conduct in the future
if the opportunity presented itself."394 In this regard, the
evidence was cumulative because the "record [was] replete with
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder might reasonably
conclude that Tyson had such a belief."395 Furthermore, the
evidence was not vital because "an honest and reasonable belief
that a member of the opposite sex will consent to sexual
conduct at some point in the future is not a defense to rape or
criminal deviate conduct," only "the defendant's honest and
reasonable belief at [the time of the sexual conduct], and not at
any other point, . . . is relevant."396 The evidence was also
cumulative for impeachment purposes because the prosecutrix
"was impeached on other points, including the details of the
rape."397 Finally, the extra burdens which this testimony
would have created, including recalling all of the prosecution's
witnesses and the delay caused by the extensive discovery
necessary to determine the accuracy and veracity of the new
witnesses, were too great given the evidence's "nature and
398
marginal relevance and the status of the trial at the time.
399
Therefore, this testimony was properly excluded.
The second issue was whether it was error to preclude
"evidence regarding incidents between [prosecutrix] and her
parents which allegedly would have shown that [she] had a
'powerful and secret motive' to fabricate the rape charge and
would have exposed an alternative explanation for the
psychological problems experienced by [the prosecutrix]
following the subject incident."40 0 The defense contended that
exclusion of this evidence violated his Sixth Amendment
rights. 40 1 The appeals court did not consider the issue however,

394 Id. at 286.
395 Id.

Id.
Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 287.
398 Id.at 288.
396

397

399 Id.
400 Id. at 288-89.
401 Id. at 289.
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as it had been waived due to Tyson's failure to preserve the
40 2
issue for appeal.
In the third argument on appeal, Tyson claimed that it
was error to exclude "all evidence of [the prosecutrix's] prior
sexual conduct because the State 'opened the door' by making
'an all out effort to portray [her] as a paragon of innocence and
virtue."' 40 3 The appellate court held that this issue too was
waived because Tyson had again failed to preserve it.404 The
court did address the issue in a footnote, however. 40 5 The court
stated, in dicta, that the exclusion of this evidence was not an
abuse of discretion. 40 6 Even if the evidence was relevant to
rebut the picture of the prosecutrix as a sexual innocent, it was
barred by the rape shield statute and was not within one of the
40 7
enumerated exceptions and was therefore, not admissible.
402

403
404
405

Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 289.
Id. at 289-90.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 290 n.15.

406 Id.

Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 290 n.15. This issue has arisen in numerous cases;
the problem is one of reciprocity. The question in most cases is whether the
alleged victim is allowed to produce evidence of her previous chastity even
though the alleged rapist is not permitted to introduce evidence of
unchastity. Generally, the cases have held either that the prosecution may
not introduce the evidence because the defense is not permitted to rebut it or
that the prosecution may admit chastity evidence which the defense is then
allowed to rebut. See, e.g., People v. Wigfall, 690 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3-4 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999) (admitting prior sexual history evidence offered by the prosecution
and stating that defendant was permitted to rebut this evidence)and Gov't of
Virgin Islands v. Jacobs, 634 F.Supp. 933, 937 (D. V.I. 1986) (applying the
proscriptions of Rule 412 to evidence offered by the government). A more
appropriate result would be that the alleged victim may not introduce
chastity evidence, because it is not any more relevant or any less prejudicial
than unchastity evidence. See Jacobs, 634 F.Supp. at 939-40. In addition, if
the evidence is admitted without objection, then rebuttal testimony should
not be permitted, because the exclusion would be waived. See Tyson v. State,
619 N.E.2d 276, 289-90 (Ind. App. 1993). However, if objection is made, then
introduction of the evidence should be error. See Jacobs, 634 F.Supp. at 93940. This does not lead to the conclusion that rebuttal testimony should be
allowed, but rather, if the alleged rapist loses the trial, requires a
determination on appeal of whether the admission of the evidence created
harmful error. If so, then the holding of the trial court should be reversed
and the case should be re-tried. If not, then the holding should be affirmed.
Only in this way would the rationale behind rape shield laws be upheld, by
407
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In the final relevant issue on appeal, Tyson argued that
the trial court's refusal to give his "Tendered Instructions"
regarding his belief that the alleged victim had consented was
error. 40 8 Refusal to give the instructions could not be error,
however, because "there [was] no evidence in the record from
which a reasonable juror could conclude that Tyson reasonably
believed [the prosecutrix] consented to the sexual conduct." 40 9
Although Tyson "provide[d] some evidence that he honestly
believed [the prosecutrix] consented to sexual intercourse, [his]
assertions [were] not evidence of the reasonableness of that
belief."410 Furthermore, his description of the actual act of
intercourse and the immediately preceding events was "a plain
assertion of actual consent."4 11 Therefore, based on this
testimony, a reasonable juror could only conclude that she
consented, not that "he misunderstood [her] actions." 412 Tyson
also argued that she made statements during the sexual
conduct which "were consistent with a reasonable belief on his
part that the sex was consensual. 413 These statements
included an affirmative reaction to his question of whether she
wanted to be on top (without explaining that she wanted to get
on top in the hopes of getting away) and a request that he put
on a condom. 4 14 The appellate court held, however, that these
statements could not, in the context of an unequivocal sexual
assault charge, lead to a reasonable belief in consent. 415
Therefore, because there was "evidence of only consent or
compulsion," 4 16 there was no error in refusing to give the
4 17
instructions.

preventing the introduction of irrelevant (or minimally relevant) and highly
prejudicial evidence.
408 See Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 292. See also supra Part II.C.
409

Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 294.

410

Id.

411

Id. at 295.

412 Id.
413 Id.

See Tyson, 619 N.E.2d at 295.
See id.
416 Id. at 297.
417 See id. at 298.
414
415
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2. The Kobe Bryant Debacle
The Kobe Bryant investigation stands in sharp contrast to the
ordered trial of the Tyson case. This case was never actually
litigated due to the series of events preceding the date
scheduled for the trial to begin. Because of Bryant's status as
one of the biggest, and most likeable, stars in the National
Basketball Association (NBA), every event in the investigation
and pre-trial proceedings was subjected to in-depth coverage by
the media. This subsection will discuss some of these events
and the public reaction to the accusation and will display some
of the problems in the legal system's treatment of rape cases.
The case, which began in the summer of 2003 and came
to an abrupt halt in the summer of 2004, provides critical
insight into the current status of the law of rape and of
society's views on the subject in general. 'Wendy Murphy, a
professor at the New England School of Law in Boston and a
former prosecutor, said the case could shake many women's
faith in the justice system."418 Admittedly, this case is an
unusual case; it was not a typical rape case by any stretch of
the imagination. The differences between this case and other
rape cases serve to highlight the problems in the law of rape,
however.
The biggest problem this case illustrates is summed up
by a newspaper article headline on July 20, 2003: "Bryant's
Accuser Should Now Expect to be the Accused." 419 This is, in a
nutshell, the single biggest problem with the law of rape: the
scrutiny is placed on the prosecutrix, the alleged victim,
instead of on the defendant, the person accused of the crime.
In this case, Bryant appeared with his wife a mere four hours
after the charges were announced, at which time he stated
420
"that his only mistake was adultery."

Rape Case Against Bryant Dismissed, MSNBC NEws, Sept. 2, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5861379/.
419 Grace Lee & Rachel Uranga, Bryant's Accuser Should Now Expect to be the
available at
Accused, L.A. DAILY
NEWS
(July 20,
2003),
http://www.dailynews.com/Stories/0,1413,200-20954-1523522,00.html.
420 Id.
418
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With that, the accuser became the accused, said
Laurie Levenson, a criminal-law professor at
Loyola Law School in Los Angeles and a former
federal prosecutor. The common reversal is one
of the reasons that rape is the most
underreported crime, she said.
"From the defense team, every aspect of her life
is going to be under the microscope. Even if she
wears a provocative outfit there, there [sic] will
be a dossier on her," she said. 421
Thus, the amount of time for which the focus was on the person
accused was approximately four hours. The amount of time the
focus was on the accuser, however, was approximately fourteen
months. 422
Because the case was dismissed prior to going to trial,
the facts are sketchy and somewhat inconsistent. According to
the prosecutrix, she met Bryant on June 30, 2003 when he
checked into the hotel at which she worked. 423 She gave him a
tour of the property, and the two hit it off.424 She stated that
there was mutual flirting before and during the tour. 425 He
then asked her to come to his room, which she did. 426 She
asked for a hug, which she got.4 27 He began kissing her, he

groped her breasts and her butt, and she finally decided to
leave when he put his hand under her panties.428 When she
tried to leave, he grabbed her by the neck. 429

She became

afraid. 430 He bent her over a chair, pulled her dress up and her
421

Id.

Judge Dismisses Sexual Assault Case vs. Bryant, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Sept.
1,
2004,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004basketballnba/
09/01/kobe.dismissed.ap/.
423 Summary of Accuser's Statement to Det. Doug Winter, THE DENVER
CHANNEL, Oct. 9, 2003, http://www.thedenverchannel.comnews/2544380/
detail.html.
422

424 Id.
4 25

Id.

426 Id.
427 Id.
428 Id.
429 Id.
430 Id.
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panties down, and had intercourse with her, despite her
protests of "no."43 1 She claims that he then forced her to kiss
his penis. 432 After washing up, she went downstairs, finished
433
her work, and told the bellman what had happened.
She reported the crime to the Eagle County Sheriffs
Department the next day, July 1. 4 34 Bryant originally claimed
that he did not have sex with his accuser.4 35 He later changed
his story, admitting that he had sex with her, but denying it
was without her consent. 43 6
In this admission, Bryant
admitted that he committed adultery, but he denied that it was
nonconsensual. 437 The complaint was filed against Bryant on
July 18, 2003.438
At this point, information about the case began to be
leaked outside of the courtroom. Private, personal information
about the victim became public knowledge. This information
included her name, which was supposed to be kept confidential;
the defense attorney "let it slip," repeating the name six times
in less than ten minutes.4 39 In this same ten minute span, the
defense counsel also alleged that the "victim's vaginal injuries
might have been caused by having sex with three men in three
days." 440 This allegation came in the form of a question after
the sheriffs detective had testified that her injuries "were not
consistent with consensual sex."441 The question "seemed to
trash Colorado's 'rape shield' law."442 Additionally, evidence
431
432

Id.
Id.

433 Id.
434

Kobe Bryant's Accuser Tried to Commit Suicide Two Months Ago, ORANGE

CouNTY REGISTER,

http://www.lukeford.net/profiles/profiles/kobe-bryant.htm.

435 Randy Wyrick, Sources: Bryant Incident Began Consensually, VAIL DAILY

(July 30, 2003), available at http://www.vaildaily.comapps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20030730NEWS/307300101.
36

4

Id.

437 Id.

438

Bryant Complaint, supra note 20.

439 Melinda Kruse, Bombshell Question Clears Court, VAIL DAILY (Oct. 9,

2003),
available
at
http://www.vaildaily.com/article/20031009/
NEWS/310090101&SearchID=73203965470520.
440 Id.

Id.
Patrick O'Driscoll & Tom Kenworthy, Bryant's Hearing Ends as More
Bombshells Fall, USA TODAY (Oct. 15, 2003), availableat httpJ/www.usatoday.com/
441

442
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was inquired into by the defense attorney and reported in the
media, which showed that the alleged victim had gone to the
hospital the day after the alleged assault "wearing underwear
stained with another man's semen."44 3 The accuser admitted to
having sex with another man on June 27 or June 28, only a few
days before the alleged incident. 444 She stated that they had
used a condom. 445 Other, possibly irrelevant, information was
also revealed. This included the fact that the accuser had
446
attempted suicide four months prior to the alleged incident.
This information, which could be used to undermine the
accuser's credibility (and most likely was leaked to do so,
although not necessarily by the defense team), may or may not
be legally relevant and therefore, may or may not have been
447
admissible, depending on the facts of the case.
Additionally, a critical ruling went against the
prosecution in the case - the judge decided to allow evidence of
the accuser's sexual activity within seventy-two hours of the
448
alleged incident to be admitted into evidence.
District Judge Terry Ruckriegle ruled that the
woman's sex life in the three days surrounding
her encounter with Bryant could be admitted as
evidence, which may have bolstered the defense
contention that she slept with someone after
leaving Bryant and before she went to the
hospital exam ---a potentially key blow to her
credibility. The woman's lawyers have denied
449
the accusation.

sports/basketbalYnba/lakers/2003-10-15-bryant-hearing.xyhtm.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 Id.

446

Accuser Hospitalized This Winter in Mental Health Case, SPORTS

ILLUSTRATED,

July

4,

2003,

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/news/2003/07/24/accuser-hospitali
zed ap/.
447 See State v. Gregory W. K, 1997 Del. Fain. Ct. LEXIS 8 (No. JN96-2161),
and cases cited therein.
448 Rape Case Against Bryant Dismissed, supranote 419.
449 Id.
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The case was ultimately dropped when the alleged victim "no
longer wanted to participate." 450
"[A]fter mistakes that
revealed her identity, at least two death threats and relentless
45 1
media attention, she apparently had had enough."
Moreover, the alleged victim faced other problems which
are typical for rape complainants. According to California
Supreme Court Justice Armand Arabian, "[d]espite the
changes [in society], . . . a rape victim still faces the idea that
'she is of corrupt motive' and driven by financial gain." 452 This
causes the existence of corroborating evidence to acquire
extraordinary importance to a successful prosecution - a
requirement that theoretically does not even exist.453 This
corroboration typically consists of cries for help that are heard
by other witnesses, torn clothing, bruises, and injuries. 454 The
timing of the complaint is also important. 455 All of these factors
should be familiar by now as these are the same elements that
have been contemplated and required for the last 800 plus
456
years.
Finally, the most telling aspect of this case has yet to be
mentioned. This facet of the case is public perception. One
major example of this is the lack of focus on or interest in the
fact that Bryant did commit adultery, no matter what else
happened. 457 Whether his accuser consented or not, he still
cheated on his wife. This fact was largely glossed over by the
media and the public alike. The few news articles that mention
it at all only have a one sentence, unemotional, matter of fact
statement concerning this fact. 458
Contrast this with the
rampant interest in the possibility that the accuser may have
engaged in intercourse with other people before and/or after

450
451
452

Judge Dismisses Sexual Assault Case us. Bryant, supra note 423.
Rape Case Against Bryant Dismissed, supra note 419.
Lee & Uranga, supra note 420.

453 Id.

454 Id.
455

Id.

456 See infra Parts I-II.

See Wyrick, supra note 436.
See, e.g., id.; Associated Press, Judge Dismisses Sexual Assault Case vs.
Bryant, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 1, 2004, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
2004/basketball/nba/09/01/kobe.dismissed.ap/
457
458
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the alleged incident,
the difference
is astounding.
Furthermore, the reactions of people, and the topics of the case
A sample of
that people discuss, are very revealing.
459
discussions will prove the point:
Not naming the women (and victims of sex
crimes are usually women) is blatant sexism.
If [rape accusers] want to avoid the publicity of
charging a star with rape, they should not file a
charge, and they should see if there's anything
they can learn from the experience, such as do
not go to a man's room alone unless you want to
have sex.
Dennis Prager points out that Kobe has
developed a strong moral bank account ....
He
got married.
According to Ms Magazine, rape is any sex a
woman regrets.
Her past gives plenty of reasons for people to
question and criticize her.
[Women need to fight the infantilism of the
feminists and expect to look after their own
safety by being reasonable and sensible about
where they go and with whom.
This is just a small sampling, but it is very revealing. The
discussions concentrate on the accuser, not the accused. Not
only is the fact that Bryant admitted to adultery not held
against him, the fact that he is married is credited to him.
Many people blame her for what happened saying that she
should have taken more care of herself.

459 All of the following examples come from: Kobe Bryant's Accuser Tried to
Commit Suicide Two Months Ago, supra note 435.
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IV. INTEGRATING RAPE CONCERNS INTO THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE

"[An appellate court should avoid theories that are rape-specific
in their application."460

The subject of the issues on appeal in the Mike Tyson
relating to "sexual"462 conduct and prior history of the
prosecutrix and the number and substance of the problems that
occurred in the Kobe Bryant trial463 indicate that substantial
problems remain in rape trials. The rape shield statutes,
although helpful in some cases, have not solved the problems.
case 461

Therefore, it seems appropriate to reevaluate these rules and to
answer the fundamental question underlying the usefulness of
any evidentiary rule: do the additional protections afforded to
rape complainants outweigh the negative consequences created
by the rape shield laws?
The answer posited by this Article is no. In light of the
464
history and tradition within which the law of rape developed
and the rules were created, the negative consequences flowing
from the rules overshadow the benefits they afford. This does
not, however, mean that these statutes should just be repealed
- that would make the problem even worse by implying that
the evidence barred by the rules should be permitted. Instead,
the rules should be incorporated into the other rules of
evidence by implication in the notes accompanying the rule
460

Christine Kenmore, Note, The Admissibility of Extrajudicial Rape

Complaints, 64 B.U. L. REV. 199, 237 (1984).

See supra Part III.C.1.
In this context, sexual appears to encompass less provocative acts, such as
holding hands, as well as more traditional "sexual" actions, such as sexual
intercourse. See supra id.
463 See supra Part III.C.2.
464 Interpretation of statutes, rights, and rules typically involves analyzing
the provision or right in light of its history and tradition. See, e.g., Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) (considering history and tradition in
determining individual substantive rights to engage in sexual matters) and
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("Our decisions
establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition.").
461
462
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when possible and by explicit addition to the text of the rule
itself when necessary. This section will therefore discuss first,
what negative consequences the rape-specific rules create and
why these negate the benefits of these rules and second, how
the benefits of the rules can be assimilated into the other rules.
A. Aggregate Effects of the Rape-Specific Evidentiary
Rules
The rape shield rules do offer protection to rape complainants.
Rule 412 offers a clear presumption against admissibility of
evidence regarding other sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition of the alleged victim. 46 5 It also unequivocally
requires any evidence proposed to be admitted under an
exception to the rule to be subjected to explicit procedural
requirements, including notice and an in camera hearing before
trial. 466 Rules 413-415 relax the rules of admissibility for prior
act evidence of the alleged rapist by allowing evidence of prior
467
acts of sexual assault or child molestation.
The rules also generate negative consequences for
alleged victims.
When considered cumulatively, these
consequences tend to overwhelm the benefits that flow from the
rape shield laws. These negative effects can generally be
separated into three categories. First, the rules themselves are
hard to interpret because they contain numerous ambiguities,
broad language, and exceptions. Second, the rules suffer from
a hole created by the mistake of fact defense, which further
confuses the trial and provides a backdoor entrance for
admissibility of a complainant's sexual history. Finally, the
existence of the rules in and of itself reinforces the biases and
prejudices which have pervaded rape law since its creation.
Each of these concerns will be addressed in more detail below.

465

See FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
R. EVID. 412(c).
See FED. R. EVID. 413-415.

466 See FED.
467
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1. Interpretation Difficulties
The first problem with rape shield statutes is that they
contain numerous exceptions and ambiguities, which end up
detracting from the protection the statutes were intended to
establish and creating confusion and additional concentration
on the information intended to be private. Rule 412 provides
exceptions from its general ban of sexual evidence in criminal
cases for three enumerated reasons, including for "evidence the
exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the
defendant." 468 This exception, in particular, is unnecessary and
confusing. 469 It is unnecessary because a statute does not have
the power to preclude constitutional rights. 470 It is confusing
because it provides "no guidance to trial courts regarding what
evidence meets the statutory standard."471 The determination
of this issue - what evidence is constitutionally required - also
focuses the attention of the trial on disputed sexual conduct, as
evinced in the cases of Michigan v. Lucas472 (considering
whether evidence of a prior sexual relationship was
constitutionally required to be admitted by the Sixth
Amendment) and Commonwealth v. Spiewak473 (revolving
around the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to
evidence of prior sexual conduct which would explain a
statement made by the prosecutrix). Thus, the trial ends up
concentrating on the activity that it is meant to help protect
and keep secret. Additionally, the rule never defines "sexual
474
misconduct," "sexual behavior," or "sexual predisposition."
This ambiguity creates another potential issue which focuses
the attention in a trial onto questionably sexual conduct whether the conduct is "sexual" within the meaning of the
statute. This problem is demonstrated by the issues in People
v. Ivers475 (discussing the applicability of the rape shield
468
469
470

471
472

Id. 412(b)(1)(C).
See Galvin, supra note 246, at 886-87.
See id. at 886.
Id. at 887.
500 U.S. 145 (1991); see also supra Part III.A.

473 617 A.2d 696 (Pa. 1992); see also supra Part III.A.
474 See FED. R. EVID. 412.
475 587 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 1998); see also supraPart III.A.
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statute to statements made by the prosecutrix). Finally, Rules
413 and 414 (and 415 by incorporation) define "offense of
sexual assault"476 and "offense of child molestation" 477 by
providing a list of applicable offenses, including reference to
other code provisions. These definitions, although provided,
are still not clear and can be difficult for courts to apply, as
seen in the case of United States v. Bull 47 8 (determining
admissibility of evidence of prior convictions of the defendant
for sexual abuse of a child pursuant to Rules 413-415).
2. Mistake of Fact
Another problem with rape shield statutes is that they
suffer from the introduction of the mistake of fact defense into
the rape context. Prior to the abolition of the resistance
requirement, mistake of fact was not a viable defense in rape
trials - an alleged rapist could not claim reasonable belief of
consent if the alleged victim had physically resisted. Now,
however, resistance is not generally an element of the crime of
rape, 479 and reasonable belief in consent has become a viable
defense to the charge. 480 This means that any information
which the alleged rapist learned about prior to the alleged
incident may be admissible to show that he reasonably believed
there was consent, even if there was not. In effect, it provides
the defense with a back door method of introducing sexual
behavior and sexual predisposition evidence despite the
existence of the general ban of the rape shield law. Thus, the
statutes again only place greater emphasis on this evidence
because of the issue of whether the evidence is barred by the
rule or admitted for the alternate purpose of showing mistake
of fact. Illustrations of this issue are provided by the cases of
Doe v. United States48 1 (permitting introduction of evidence to

476 FED. R. EVID. 413(d).
477 FED. R. EvID. 414(d).

32 Fed. App'x 778 (8th Cir. 2002); see also supraPart III.B.
479 See KAPLAN, WEISBERG, & BINDER, supra note 15, at 1109.
478

See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981) and Tyson v.
State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
481 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981).

480

2010

WE'RE ONLY FOOLING OURSELVES

show the defendant's belief that the alleged victim had
48 2
consented) and Tyson v. State.
3.

Inherent Biases

A final problem with rape shield statutes stems from
the reasons that produced the statutes and the inferences they
create. Rape shield laws were passed with the background
history and tradition of the law of rape in mind. 48 3 Therefore,
these laws are premised on the ideas that they are necessary
for the protection of rape complainants and that the evidence
prohibited by the rules would otherwise be admissible. 4 4 For
this reason, the enactment of these rules creates the
impression that the prohibited evidence would be relevant and
This, in turn, creates the
admissible without the rules.
inference that the sexual history and "predisposition" of a
woman are relevant to her consent and conduct in the case at
bar. The basis for this inference, however, is the history and
tradition surrounding the law of rape. Thus, the rules generate
a circular pattern of reasoning, whereby the courts are
precluded from helping society overcome the prejudices and
biases that women who have consented once are more likely to
consent in this instance. 48 5 In this way, the rules actually
prevent progress from occurring in societal attitudes about rape
and in the law of rape. Finally, the implication that these rules
are necessary to protect rape complainants because the other
rules are insufficient for this purpose is faulty as displayed by
619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
484
Id.
485 In today's society, it is just as likely that a woman who has never engaged
in intercourse previously would be more likely to consent to a given occasion,
simply because society has produced a culture in which engaging in
intercourse is the norm and abstinence is unusual. Even the television show
"Friends" displays this attitude; for example, when a character goes six
months without intercourse, this is a big deal and is considered a "long" time.
See Friends: The One With the Videotape (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 18,
2001). Another popular show, Seinfeld, presents another example, when the
characters have a contest to see who is "the master of his domain," and each
of them succumbs to masturbation within a matter of days. See Seinfeld: The
Contest (Sony Pictures Television broadcast, Sept. 16, 1992).
482
483
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the cases of People v. Rincon-Pineda486 (rejecting the use of the
cautionary instruction for rape cases and finding that the bases
for the instruction had been determined to be unfounded) and
Pope v. Superior Court48 7 (finding that evidence of unchastity is
generally inadmissible, except in certain limited circumstances,
because the evidence did not prove consent and it confused the
issues).
B. Incorporating Rape Shield Laws into Other Rules
The myth that the rape shield laws are necessary to
protect rape complainants can be dispelled by an analysis of
other provisions of the rules of evidence which could adequately
serve the concerns protected by these laws. Other applicable
provisions include Rules 401 (relevancy), 403 (unfair prejudice),
404 (character evidence), 405 (methods of proving character),
406 (habit), 608 (character of a witness), and 104 (preliminary
questions). How each of these rules applies and how they can
serve the goals of the rape shield law or be reformed to do so is
addressed below.
1.

Rule 401

Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. 48 8 This is a
minimum requirement, and it is subject to numerous
exceptions; nonetheless, all evidence must be relevant to be
admissible. 48 9 Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has
"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable
490
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
When applied to the crime of rape, the biggest questions for the
relevancy of evidence regard evidence pertaining to the
accuser's sexual history. The issue is whether sexual history
evidence is relevant in the case. Generally speaking, the
486
487

538 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1975); see also supra Part II.A.
545 P.2d 946 (Ariz. 1976); see also supra Part II.A.

488 FED. R. EVID. 401, 402.
489 FED.

R. EvrD. 402.
401.

490 FED. R. EVID.
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answer should be no. 491 This is the generally accepted answer,
492
and it is the answer articulated in the rape shield laws.

What the woman has done in the past generally has no bearing
on whether she consented in this particular instance. The
woman is free to change her ways, to deny this particular man,
or to just not feel like it - or to refuse for any other reason she
may choose.
There are exceptions, however. Past sexual history is
relevant to show that someone else was the source of semen,
injury, disease, or bruises. 493 This evidence may be relevant if
the evidence relates to specific acts between the defendant and
the alleged victim 494 depending on the situation. This should

not be a blanket grant of relevancy. The relevancy of this
evidence is contingent upon the facts of the case; if the act
happened ten years ago, it probably will not be relevant, but if
it happened yesterday, then it has a higher probability of
relevancy (the feelings or reasons that led to consent yesterday
are more likely to exist today than the feelings that led to
consent ten years ago because less time has passed; this is not,
however, an absolute rule). 495

Thus, the prevailing rule on

relevancy should be that sexual history is generally not
relevant, but there are a few exceptions for purposes which are
always relevant, and the evidence should always be analyzed
for relevancy by the trial judge.
2. Rule 403
Even if the evidence is relevant, it still may be

inadmissible. The federal rules prohibit relevant evidence "if
491 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 412.
492

Id.

493 See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A); see also People v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 1017,

1020-21 (1983) ("Here, the trial court properly allowed evidence concerning
the source of semen found on the victim's jeans.").
494 See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B); see also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663,
670-71 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that prior sexual conduct between the
defendant and his accuser was constitutionally required to be admitted).
495 See Karen M. Fingar, And Justice ForAll: The Admissibility of Uncharged
Sexual Misconduct Evidence Under the Recent Amendment to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 501, 541-42 (1996).
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its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."496 As applied to the
crime of rape, the main concerns are unfair prejudice and/or
confusion of the issues. This means that the evidence cannot
be unfairly prejudicial to either the plaintiff or the defendant
and it cannot make the jury concentrate on an issue that
distracts the focus of their attention from the question of
whether or not the woman was raped.
Of particular
importance to the determination of whether the evidence
causes unfair prejudice is the history and tradition of biases
and prejudices against the veracity of rape complainants.
Throughout the development of rape law, rape complainants
have faced substantial suspicion regarding the truth of their
charges. 497 Coupled with the typically low probative value of
previous sexual conduct, this history suggests that prior sexual
conduct and predisposition of the prosecutrix should be
carefully scrutinized under this factor.
Furthermore, the
tendency of rape trials to focus on the admissibility and
importance of prior sexual conduct by the alleged victim should
also weigh in favor of finding the evidence inadmissible under
this rule.
Finally, the rape shield laws' proclivity for
exacerbating the focus on the prior conduct of the alleged
victim actually acts counterproductively with this factor.
3.

Rules 404, 405, 406, and 608

Character evidence is generally not admissible under
the federal rules. 498 Character evidence of an alleged victim is
only permissible to prove action in conformity therewith if it is
a pertinent trait.499 Past sexual history should never be
considered a pertinent "trait." Society today no longer speaks
of rape as being about chastity; rape is regarded now as being

496 FED. R. EVID. 403.
497 See supra Parts 1-3.

R. EvID. 404.
499 FED. R.EvID. 404(a).
498 FED.
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about the woman's autonomy.5 0 0 Society's expressed attitude
recognizes that sexual conduct is no longer considered to be a
"distinguishing feature"5 0 1 of a person's character, even if the
overt treatment of rape victims has yet to display this
recognition. 50 2 Furthermore, although previous sexual activity
would affect a person's chastity, it does not affect an
autonomous decision of whether to engage in sex or not;
therefore, the fact that a woman has slept with a man before,
even if that man is the defendant, generally has no bearing on
whether she consented on the occasion in question.
Additionally, "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith."50 3
Although this
provision originally intended past sexual conduct evidence of
the alleged victim to be admissible under an exception, 50 4 the
advisory notes which accompany the rule could be changed
from expressing an inclusive intent to expressing a prohibitive
intent. This means that specific actions of sexual conduct
would not be admissible unless presented for a different
purpose - in which case, the character rules would not apply.
Finally, character evidence of a witness is admissible when it
50 5
pertains to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
This provision does not permit any sexual behavior history,
50 6
however, as sexual behavior has no correlation to veracity;
there is one possible exception, if the alleged victim were to
make a false statement during her testimony which could then
500

See Rodes, supra note 14, at 686.

501 WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 726 (Berkley ed. 1984) (defining

"trait" as "a distinguishing feature, as of one's character").
502 Compare Rodes, supra note 14, at 686 (discussing the shift in attitude
toward rape from an affront to chastity to an affront to autonomy), with the
Kobe Bryant case, supra Part III.C.2 (displaying how society reacted to the
accusations against Kobe Bryant).
503 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).

504 See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2) advisory committee's note.
505 FED. R. EVID. 608.
506 See McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74, 78 (D.C. App. 1977) ("It should

be obvious that evidence of prior sexual acts by the prosecutrix has no
relevance whatsoever to her credibility as a witness and therefore defense
counsel should be precluded from asking the prosecutrix questions concerning
her past sex life.").
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be impeached during cross examination by her previous sexual
conduct.50 7 In this case, the evidence would be evaluated under
Rule 403, and it would most likely only be admissible if there
was no other impeachment evidence and was not highly
prejudicial. Thus, evidence of past sexual activity is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity with
the particular character of the woman. It should be noted,
however, that this rule in no way limits admission of this
evidence for other purposes; admissibility for other purposes
would be evaluated under the other rules of evidence.
If character for sexual predisposition or sexual conduct
was considered to be admissible, it would then have to follow
the provisions of Rule 405.508 This rule allows reputation or
opinion evidence of any admissible character trait, and it
50 9
allows evidence of specific conduct on cross-examination.
Therefore, to retain the protections of the rape shield statutes
in the event that character evidence was determined to be a
pertinent character trait, this rule would need to be modified.
This could be done without too much trouble by simply adding
an exception into Rule 405(a) for character for sexual conduct
and predisposition, which may only be admitted as specific acts
introduced for certain enumerated purposes. This addition
would cover the concerns articulated in Rule 412.
Finally, it could be argued that previous sexual conduct
is relevant under Rule 406.510 This rule declares that evidence
of habit is relevant to show action in conformity with that
habit. 511 Habit "describes one's regular response to a repeated

See People v. Wigfall, 690 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); see also
Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Jacobs, 634 F.Supp. 933, 940 (D.V.I. 1986)
(holding that impeachment evidence consisting of prior sexual conduct must
be admitted when the government has opened the door). But see Tyson v.
State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 290 & n.15 (Ind.App. 1993), wherein the court upheld
the trial court's ruling in limine that evidence of the prosecutrix's previous
507

unchastity was not admissible to rebut the "angelic image" of the prosecutrix
created by the prosecution.
508 FED. R. EVID. 405.
509 Id.
510 FED. R. EVID. 406.
511 Id.
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specific situation."512 Furthermore, "[t]he doing of the habitual
acts may become semi-automatic." 513 It should be apparent
that sexual activity itself would not qualify as habit - a woman
cannot have a "regular response" of consenting to sleep with
any man who offers, and consenting to sex is not "semiautomatic." Nor would it be appropriate to qualify consenting
to sex with a particular individual as a "habit," even though a
stronger argument could be made, because consent to sexual
conduct can never be "semi-automatic." This rule could operate
to make evidence of prior reports or claims of a similar nature
to the claim made against the alleged rapist relevant,
however. 5 14 In that situation, the prior similar report or claim
could be a habitual response to a set of circumstances in which
the alleged victim finds herself. In these cases, the evidence
51 5
should properly be admitted.
4. Rule 104
The Federal Rules of Evidence also contain a provision
for the determination of the admissibility of evidence. 516 This
reads:
Questions,"
"Preliminary
entitled
provision,
"Preliminary questions concerning the . . . admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court."517 Furthermore,
"[h]earings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted
[outside the hearing of the jury] when the interests of justice
Thus, this rule provides for an avenue of
require."51 8
conducting in camera hearings to determine the admissibility
of past sexual activity evidence. The admissibility of the
512

Fed. R. Evid. 406 advisory committee's note (quoting

MCCORMICK ON

EVIDENCE § 162 (J. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999)).
513
Id. (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 162

(J. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999)).
514 See United States v. Stamper, 766 F.Supp. 1396, 1401-04 (W.D.N.C. 1991)
(holding that evidence that amounted to a prior scheme or modus operandi
was required to be admitted).
515 The evidence should be admitted, but its weight should be carefully
considered and argued by counsel, given the fact that admissibility of prior
reports or claims could operate to make women who have levied previous
accusations or charges targets of potential rapists.
516

See FED. R. EVID. 104.
R. EVID. 104(a).
FED. R. EVID. 104(c).

517 FED.
518
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evidence must be determined by the court, and the privacy
interest of the woman requires that the matter be conducted
out of the hearing of the jury. Thus, this rule affords the same
protection as the provisions for in camera hearings to
determine admissibility under Rules 412-415. Finally, the
notice and discovery deadline requirements can be imposed by
the judge through his common law powers and under Rule
611.519
V. TOWARD A RATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF RAPE
"There is no uniform response to rape, or a uniform time
for recovery."520
Much of this Article has been devoted to showing the
history and current status of rape. The focus has been on the
problems, biases, and prejudices inherent in the law. This
section suggests a plan that could be implemented going
forward, to reduce the occurrences of these issues and to
521
promote progress in the law and protection of rape victims.
As it currently stands, rape law is a product of a long
history of prejudice and bias against rape complainants.
Although some progress has been made, at least some of the
biases which existed in the twelfth century still inherent in our
rape law today. Nonetheless, progress has been made. The
rape shield laws themselves are signs of that progress. There
are other signs of progress too, particularly in cases from the
1970s, such as People v. Rincon-Pineda 22 (refusing to give a
cautionary jury instruction in a rape case) and State ex rel.

519 FED. R. EVID. 611.

520 BROWNMILLER, supra note Error!Bookmark not defined., at 361.

521 An alternative solution which might help alleviate some of the problems
associated with rape law would be to create more than one category of rape.
Multiple categories would allow for multiple levels of punishment, thereby
reducing the ambivalence that juries have about inflicting the relatively
drastic sentences on men convicted based solely on the testimony of the
prosecutrix. See Rodes, supra note 14, at 689. The arguments behind
implementing this change are outside the scope of this Article, however.
522 538 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1975).

2010

WE'RE ONLY FOOLING OURSELVES

Pope v. Superior Court523 (recognizing that past sexual conduct
evidence is generally not admissible). However, since the great
strides taken in the 1970s, there appears to have been little
additional progress. Ironically, major reasons for this sudden
halt in improvement are the rape shield statutes themselves.
The rape shield laws, although initially helpful, have
become detrimental to the women they were intended to
protect. In addition to the problems discussed above, these
laws have stymied the courts' ability to advance the protection
and privacy afforded to women in rape cases. Because these
rules are statutory law, they cannot be modified by the courts.
Therefore, the courts "may not graft additional exceptions onto
the statute [s]. '"524 Without this ability, however, courts are not
free to promote the interests of rape complainants because they
are bound by the strictures of the rape shield laws.
An alternative method of achieving the goals of the rape
shield statutes could fulfill these goals while alleviating this
obstruction to progress. This method is to repeal the rules
which expressly pertain only to rape and sexual conduct cases
and infuse the positive aspects of these rules into the other
rules of evidence. 525 A simple method of accomplishing this
change could be achieved by merely discussing the proper
application of the rules to the rape context in the advisory
committee notes which accompany each rule. In fact, the notes
originally associated with Rule 404(a)(2) did specifically refer
to rape cases, albeit by providing that previous sexual conduct
of the alleged victims of rape was admissible character
Thus, the proper application of the rules of
evidence. 526
evidence to rape cases could be articulated by the committee
notes as opposed to express, stand-alone rules of evidence
applicable solely to the rape context.
This method of addressing rape concerns would also
provide the flexibility necessary for courts to promote progress
in rape trials. Use of advisory notes would provide guidelines
545 P.2d 946 (Ariz. 1976).
Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 290 n.15 (Ind. App. Ct. 1993) (quoting
Kelly v. State, 586 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind.App. 1992)).
525 See supra Part IV.B.
526 See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2) advisory committee's note.
523
524
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for courts so that courts would have some precedent to rely

upon in rejecting the argument that repeal of the rape shield
laws opens the door for past sexual conduct evidence, but they
would not bind the courts. This means that courts would have
discretion in the application of the rules of evidence to rape
cases. With this discretion, judges would be able to follow the
lead of the judges of the highest courts in California 27 and
Arizona 528 by applying the rules of evidence to protect the
privacy of the rape complainant and thereby move the focus of
rape trials away from the victim and onto the attacker. The
privacy of the victim could then be appropriately balanced
against the rights of the defendant so that most prior sexual
conduct evidence of the alleged victim is excluded, but evidence
which is vital to the alleged rapist's defense or offered for a
529
valid purpose would be admitted.
Finally, this solution offers an additional significant
benefit in rape cases. In many arenas, the legal system leads,
or even pushes, society to change its attitude and perception of
an issue. A prime example of this phenomenon occurred in the
equal rights movement during the middle of the twentieth
century. 530
The legal system required school integration
despite massive resistance within society. 531
It forced
perceptions of inequality to begin to change. 532 This same
trend could occur within the rape context. If the rape laws are
repealed, but their effect is maintained through the use of the
other rules, the legal system would be showing society that the
rules are not necessary to prevent admission of prior sexual
conduct evidence; in effect, retaining the outcomes of the rape
shield laws, but not the laws themselves would show that a
victim's chastity or unchastity has no, or extremely little,
relevance in the normal rape case. In addition, if judges are
permitted to exercise discretion to develop the law of rape,
there is the potential that they will be able to lead or push
See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1975).
See Pope v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946 (Ariz. 1976).
529 See supra Part IV.B.1.
530 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
531 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown I).
532 See id.
527
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CONCLUSION
"You still have a choice."533
The 2002 movie Minority Report, based upon the novel
of the same name by Philip K. Dick, portrayed a futuristic
society in which our fate was predetermined.5 3 4 Three "PreCogs" have visions of murders which have not happened, but
are going to in the future. 5 35 This enables the Pre-Crime Unit
to catch the murderers before the murders actually take
place. 536 The plot of the movie, however, revolves around the
conundrum that is created by the conflict between the concept
of Pre-Crime and the defining characteristic of humanity: free
choice. 537 As humans, we can always change our minds. But if
we are fated to fulfill this vision of a murder, then free choice
does not exist, and there is no real choice in our actions. In the
end, the moral shows that humans do have free choice: we are
free to change our minds, right up until the point that we
5 38
actually do something.
This same premise can be applied to the crime of rape.
A woman, or a man, is entitled to change his or her mind
anytime before intercourse. A person is never committed to
consenting to sexual relations with another. This is true
whether or not the person has slept with a third person before,
whether the person has slept with the defendant of the case
before, or whether the person has actually consented and then
retracted that consent. Thus, the statement that a woman
should learn not to go to a man's hotel room unless she is going
to sleep with him is ludicrous. The woman is entitled to
choose.
533 MINORITY REPORT

2002).
534

Id.
535 Id.
53
6 Id.
537 Id.
538

Id.

(Twentieth Century Fox and Dreamworks Pictures
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The law of rape in our legal system is the product of an
almost millennial-long history and tradition. This history and
tradition is rife with discrimination and mistreatment of
women and rape victims. The justice system needs to recognize
this and account for it. The justice system needs to do this in a
constructive manner, which will begin to alleviate the cultural
and societal perception that rape is substantially and
dramatically different. Thus, laws and evidentiary rules that
single out rape for disparate treatment should be repealed and
incorporated into the other rules of evidence.
This
incorporation can even be explicit in the notes and commentary
that accompany each rule. In this manner, the beneficent
purpose of the rules will be realized, but the negative
implications and the effect of perpetuating the stereotypes and
perceptions that the laws and rules are designed to combat will
be avoided. Instead, the crime of rape should be treated
similarly to other crimes.
Societal perceptions of the crime of rape and of rape
victims must be changed. Society needs to recognize that it is
the defendant who is on trial, not the alleged victim. Society
needs to abandon its fear of the vindictive female and realize
that the burden of proof is already on the prosecution or
complainant and that rape is no more likely to result in
mistaken convictions than other crimes (if anything, it is less
likely to do so at this stage in history). Both men and women
in our society need to realize one very important thing: no
means no. The legal system needs to take the first step
towards change, however, by removing a major impediment to
progress - the embodiment of a history and tradition of
prejudice and bias against rape complainants that is a rape
shield law. By taking this step, the legal system can make a
simple, yet powerful statement to rape victims: you still have a
choice.

